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REGULATING THE MONEYCHANGERS
Jerry Markham*
INTRODUCTION
“The foreign exchange1 . . . market is the most liquid sector of the
global economy and generates the largest amount of cross-border payments
on a daily basis, with an average daily turnover of $5.3 trillion.”2 That
market is critical to commerce because it “facilitates international trade and
investments through the determination of exchange rates, conversion of
national currencies and transfer of funds.”3 This critically requires
effective regulation on a global basis, especially in the United States, which
is a hub for such trading because of the importance of the dollar in
international trade and finance.4
The foreign exchange market is now regulated domestically by no less
than five regulators: the Commodities Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Fed).5 Those multiple and redundant regulators have not proved to
be effective or efficient in preventing abusive business practices. This is
demonstrated by the recent civil and criminal actions that charged several
large banks with fraud and manipulation of the foreign exchange market on

* Professor, Florida International University College of Law.
1. “The expression ‘foreign-exchange’ refers to the exchange of money in one
country for money in another.” THOMAS YORK, FOREIGN EXCHANGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE
1 (1920).
2. Federal Reserve Board Bank of New York, Managing Foreign Exchange,
http://www.newyorkfed.org/financial-services-and-infrastructure/financial-marketinfrastructure-and-reform/managing-foreign-exchange/
[https://perma.cc/GS6B-2DZJ]
(accessed on April 26, 2015).
3. Id.
4. To illustrate, the dollar was involved in eighty-seven percent of the daily turnover
volume of foreign exchange in 2013. Table-Global FX Volume Reaches $5.3 Trillion a Day
in 2013-BIS, Reuters, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/05/bis-surveyvolumes-idUSL6N0GZ34R20130905 [https://perma.cc/5NYY-5HFH] (accessed on July 31,
2015).
5. See infra note 446 and accompanying text (describing that regulation).
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a massive scale, with settlements now totaling over $10 billion.6
The size and nature of the misconduct in those cases has called into
question the effectiveness of the existing regulatory structure that allowed
such practices to go undetected for several years.7 This article responds to
these concerns by advocating the creation of a single business conduct
regulator that would replace the existing five regulators. The article
recommends that the SEC and CFTC be consolidated to act as the sole
business conduct regulator for the foreign exchange market, as well as for
the markets they now regulate. Both of these agencies have experience in
regulating foreign exchange, and both have as their mission the sanctioning
of fraud and manipulation.
The author would leave prudential regulation of the interbank
exchange market to bank regulators that focus on the safety and soundness
of the banking system. Foreign exchange payment and settlement systems
are largely utilized by banks that can fail as a result of weaknesses in those
systems. The bank regulators have historically focused on concerns over
such weaknesses and should continue to do so.8
The article is divided into eight parts, including this Introduction. Part
II covers the history of the foreign exchange market. Parts III-VI describe
the development of regulation in four segments of this market: (i) the
commercial interbank market; (ii) exchange traded derivatives; (iii) retail
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives; and (iv) retail OTC cash transactions.
Part VII describes the existing ineffective multi-agency regulatory system
and advocates for the creation of a single business conduct regulator.
Finally, Part VIII concludes by proposing changes to the current regulatory
framework of the foreign exchange market, noting that if these changes are
successful, they could be applied to other areas of business conduct
regulation.

6. See infra note 200 and accompanying text (describing those settlements).
7. Huw Jones, Global Regulators to Meet in London, Fix Rules After Rigging
Scandals, Reuters, May 22, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/22/us-britainmarkets-regulator-idUSKBN0O71F320150522 [https://perma.cc/96R9-KCJV] (accessed on
May 26, 2015). See also Regulation Alone Will Not Restore Faith in Markets, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), May 26, 2015, (describing how regulators are rethinking their regulatory
approach
to
benchmarks
such
as
foreign
currency
exchange
rates),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8a41dd82-0399-11e5-a70f00144feabdc0.html#axzz3xpQTnOaa [https://perma.cc/JF66-2V27] (accessed on May 27,
2015).
8. See infra notes 182, 434, 443 and accompanying text (describing that prudential
regulation).
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HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE
MARKET

A. In the Beginning
The history of foreign exchange in ancient times is somewhat murky
and predated by exchanges of metal and barter transactions.9 Coins as
currency appear to have their origin in Lydia, where they were first minted
in the seventh century B.C.10 The use of coins as a currency soon spread to
Greece and Rome.11 From there money in the form of coins spread to the
economies of most developing civilizations.12 This coined currency
included bezants, ecus, florins, ducats, agustalias, pfennigs, hellers,
stuivers, weisspfennigs, blankes, pfunds, orrts, gulden, crona, anglots,
pesos, nobles, and dinars.13 China is attributed with the creation of paper
money, as Marco Polo discovered during his journey there in the thirteenth
century. This practice eventually spread to the West.14
Currencies often circulated outside their country of origin, and
moneychangers began exchanging the currency of one country for the
currency of another. This required the moneychangers to assess their
relative values. The most visible of these moneychangers operated in
ancient Jerusalem where they changed the currency of arriving pilgrims.
Those merchants performed a valuable service, but they were not popular
with everyone, as demonstrated by the famous act of Jesus in overturning
their tables and casting them from the Temple.15

9. PAUL EINZIG, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE, 11-14 (2D ED. 1970).
10. The
British
Museum,
The
Origins
of
Coinage,
http://www.britishmuseum.org/explore/themes/money/the_origins_of_coinage.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3EPG-SWRB] (accessed on Feb. 5, 2015).
11. Id.
12. Gold drove ancient commerce as a medium of exchange:
Conceivably gold could perform its monetary function in whatever shapes and
sizes it chanced to be. But in that case it would be necessary on every occasion
of its transfer, from buyer to seller, or between lender and borrower, to verify its
quantity by means of a pair of scales and a more or less elaborate metallurgical
test. It is to obviate the need of such internal weighings and testings that the
metal is fashioned into stamped disks of regular shape, called ‘coins’ which
cannot be tampered with without detection, each of a standard weight as
expressed by the monetary unit.
THOMAS YORK, FOREIGN EXCHANGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (1920).
13. JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900) 16 (2002).
14. JACK WEATHERFORD, THE HISTORY OF MONEY 126 (1997).
15. PAUL EINZIG, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 19 (2D ED. 1970). The activities
of the Jerusalem money changers have also been described as follows:
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Moneychangers appeared in Europe in the late Middle Ages.16 Those
merchants tested and weighed coins being exchanged, and currency was
examined to see if it was counterfeit or debased.17 These moneychangers
also exercised a banking function by safekeeping coins for merchants and

In the period of the Second Temple vast numbers of Jews streamed to Palestine
and Jerusalem ‘out of every nation under heaven’ taking with them considerable
sums of money in foreign currencies. This is referred to in the famous instance
of Jesus’ driving the money changers out of the Temple (Matt. 21:12). Not only
did these foreign coins have to be changed but also ordinary deposits were often
handed over to the Temple authorities for safe deposit in the Temple treasury.
Thus Jerusalem became a sort of central bourse and exchange mart, and the
Temple vaults served as ‘safe deposits’ in which every type of coin was
represented. The business of money exchange was carried out by the shulḥani
(‘exchange banker’), who would change foreign coins into local currency and
vice versa. People coming from distant countries would bring their money in
large denominations rather than in cumbersome small coins. The provision of
small change was a further function of the shulḥani. For both of these kinds of
transactions the shulḥani charged a small fee (agio), called in rabbinic literature
a kolbon (a word of doubtful etymology but perhaps from the Greek κόλλυβος
‘small coin.’ This premium seems to have varied from 4 percent to 8 percent.
The shulḥani served also as a banker, and would receive money on deposit for
investment and pay out an interest at a fixed rate, although this was contrary to
Jewish law.
Jewish
Virtual
Library,
Money
Changers,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0014_0_14119.html
[https://perma.cc/84X5-Q9BF] (accessed on Mar. 5, 2015) (citations omitted).
16. As one source notes:
If you only think about the enormous variety of coins in circulation, it becomes
quite obvious money changers played an important role in the economic life of
a medieval citizen. You could find them in the neighbourhood of city gates, the
market square or the townhall. Easy to find for foreign merchants and travellers
who had to pay them a visit in order to change their money into local currency.
Just as banks today, money changers received a commission on their
transactions.
National
Bank
of
Belgium
Museum,
The
Money
Changer’s
Bench,
http://www.nbbmuseum.be/2008/01/money-changers-bench.htm [https://perma.cc/WNT3G7GJ] (accessed on Mar. 5, 2015).
17. It has been noted that:
On the one hand the money changer was a private businessman but on the other
hand he also had a public function. Hence, he was closely controlled by the
authorities. He actually had two main tasks: as a public officer he had to
withdraw all forged and clipped coins and as a private businessman he was
mainly involved in changing different coin types. The first task was particularly
important to ensure a sound circulation of money. Only money changers had the
right to buy abrased or debased coins at metal value. This coined metal was
further sold to goldsmiths or mint masters.
Id.
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issuing certificates of deposits that the merchant could pass as money.18
Moneychangers also became involved in the trade in bills of
exchange. These instruments operated much like the modern check in that
the drawer was directing a third party (today this would be the bank) to pay
the holder of the bill a stated amount in a specified currency.19 Bills of
exchange were often used in foreign trade, giving rise to a need for
moneychangers to convert payments into the currency of the holder.20 Bills
of exchange that were payable in a foreign currency were a convenient
means for negating the need to transfer coins for payment in a foreign
country. Bills of exchange were also used to avoid usury prohibitions by
disguising interest through a favorable exchange rate.21
Various governmental restrictions were placed on early
moneychangers in Europe. Commonly, moneychangers were required to
obtain licenses from the ruling authority. “In most countries they had to
conform to tightly drawn official market regulations the infringement of
which entailed severe penalties.”22 Most authorities also set official
exchange rates. England went further.
Between the twelfth and
seventeenth centuries the English Crown banned private moneychangers,
placing that function into the office of the Royal Exchanger.23
Despite their regulation, abuses were present in early foreign
exchange markets. Critics of this market often claimed that exchange rates
were being manipulated. In some instances, this manipulation was
designed to protect local growers from foreign competition by making the
cost of foreign goods more expensive.24 In addition, “[t]here was much
written about the speculative activity of skillful and sinister syndicates
which were supposed to influence exchange rates to their advantage by
spreading false rumors or by other methods.”25 In the sixteenth century,
betting on exchange rates became popular through futures style
transactions, which developed into the more modern foreign exchange
market.26 The Dutch government banned such transactions in 1541.27

18. Id.
19. Business
Dictionary,
Bills
of
Exchange
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/bill-of-exchange-BOE.html
[https://perma.cc/HA57-LBY4] (accessed on Mar. 5, 2015).
20. EINZIG, supra note 10, at 63-64.
21. Id. at 69-70.
22. Id. at 103.
23. Id. at 104.
24. Id. at 80.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 120.
27. Id.

(BOF),
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B. Foreign Exchange in America
Before the Revolution, the American colonies had no single currency
they could call their own. The individual colonies issued bills of credit that
served in a limited fashion as a local currency. However, their value
fluctuated wildly and was often discounted when used as currency. To
prevent abuses in the over issuance of these bills, the Crown passed
legislation restricting their issuance.28 Otherwise, foreign coins, bills of
exchange, transactions on account and barter were used as the basis for
most colonial period commercial and retail transactions.29
After the Revolution, merchants specializing in foreign exchange
made their appearance in the United States.30 They included Brown Bros.
& Co. in New York and its Baltimore affiliate, Alexander Brown & Sons.
These merchants purchased bills of exchange from other merchants and
issued their own bills.31 By 1817, references were being made to “monied
men” carrying on “extensive and profitable operations” in foreign exchange
between U.S. cities.32 However, at least until the 1830s, commercial banks
had little involvement in the foreign exchange market because “foreign
exchange transactions were still not accepted as assuredly the proper
province of such an institution.”33 By the 1830s, “permission could be
secured . . . for the mere profit making exigencies of the exchange
merchants themselves, [i.e., speculation] . . . . [F]oreign-exchange trading
was, indeed, ceasing to be wholly a supplementary element in international
merchandising and was growing into a distinct and complicated business of
itself.”34
The foreign exchange market between America and London was
disrupted by the Civil War.35 However, the British and American
Exchange Banking Corp. Ltd. was operating a foreign exchange business
that used bills of lading attached to bills of exchange as collateral. The
company also handled gold shipments. After the Civil War, speculators
facilitated the rise of a more sophisticated trading system in foreign
currency exchange. “In this connection mention may be made of a
28. MARKHAM, supra note 14, at 50-55.
29. Boston
Federal
Reserve
Bank,
History
of
Colonial
Money,
https://www.bostonfed.org/education/pubs/historyo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DV2W-8LBR]
(accessed on March 5, 2015).
30. A.H. Cole, Evolution of the Foreign-Exchange Market of the United States, 1 J.
ECON. & BUS. HIST. 384, 390 (1929).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 396.
33. Id. at 390, 394.
34. Id. at 404.
35. Id. at 417-418.
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phenomenon peculiar to the boom periods around 1866 and 1873—the use
of ‘borrowed’ exchange for speculative purposes.”36 The post-Civil War
speculators borrowed time bills from foreign exchange firms, sold those
borrowed bills and used the funds generated by the sale to speculate in
other markets. Further, technological advances of communications by the
1880s radically increased security speculators’ (who served as the
predecessors of today’s arbitrageurs) availability of foreign exchange
transactions, rendering feasible the development of a ‘retail’ market in
currencies.37
Futures contracts in foreign exchange were developed in the 1870s for
grain exporters by the foreign exchange operations of Alexander Brown &
Sons in Baltimore, Maryland. The exporters entering into those contracts
were seeking to hedge the risks of foreign currency fluctuations between
the time of the acceptance of a foreign grain order and its payment.38 Such
futures contracts were not traded on exchanges but were sold over-thecounter.39
C. The Role of Gold and Silver in Foreign Exchange
Gold and silver historically played a central role in the foreign
exchange market in the U.S. because those precious metals were, as in
ancient times, the standard used to value one currency against another.
There has been a long running debate of the proper ratio in valuing silver
against gold. In ancient times, the ratio was generally from twelve to
twenty parts silver to one part gold.40 The Coinage Act passed by the U.S.
Congress in 1792 set the value of gold to silver at a ratio of 15:1, which
was a measure for pricing gold and silver coins.41 The Coinage Act of
1834 also authorized debt payments in gold and silver coins from England,
France, Portugal and Brazil.42 Moneychangers continued to deal in other
coins. For example, the firm of Spofford and Tileston was offering a
premium for Mexican coins in May 1835.43 Exchange in America was a
confusing matter. Prices for Spanish coins were often quoted in British

36. Id. at 410.
37. Id. at 415-416.
38. Edwin J. Perkins, The Emergence of a Futures Market for Foreign Exchange in the
United States, 11 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 193, 200, 202 (1974).
39. Id.
40. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, THE POWER OF GOLD 25 (2000). In Egypt around 4000 B.C.
the ratio of gold was set at what appears to be a historic low of 10:1.
41. 1 Stat. 246 (1792).
42. 4 Stat. 669 (1834).
43. MARKHAM, supra note 14, at 179.
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valuations, rather than by their dollar value.44 However, the Coinage Act of
1857 sought to stop that business by prohibiting the use of foreign coins as
legal tender.45
The Civil War gave rise to much speculation in gold on which the
value of Union currency, the “Greenbacks,” was based. The value of that
currency would rise and fall with each Union victory or defeat. The price
of the $20 gold double-eagle coins, which contained about an ounce of
gold, fluctuated during the war between $135 and $285.46
The
Confederacy created a unique instrument for foreign exchange. It was a trivalued bond (this was the so-called Erlanger Bond named after its principal
underwriter). The purchaser of the bond was given the option of receiving
interest and principal payments in cotton, British sterling or French francs.
However, the bond became worthless at the end of the war.47
Speculation in gold continued after the Civil War and culminated in
1869 with Jay Gould’s epic attempt to corner that market. Gould had
suborned officials in the Grant administration to withhold government sales
as a means to drive up its price. However, the corner was broken after
President Grant became suspicious and ordered large gold sales.48 More
important for the foreign exchange business was the post-war debate over
whether the country should continue the paper currency used by the North
during that conflict. Many believed that the government should return to a
“specie” standard in which only gold and/or silver would be accepted as
legal tender. It was thought that this would curb the speculation that had
occurred during the war.49 Such a specie standard would also reduce

44. As one author noted:
[P]eople were perfectly used to dealing in Spanish coins and giving them British
valuations. Even the dollar, capstone of the Jeffersonian system, struggled for
recognition. Into the 1850s the people of New England called a dollar six
shillings. Nine shillings was $1.50; ten and six meant $1.75. A Spanish real
was a New York shilling; eight reals made a dollar, and one real was worth
twelve and a half cents. Ten reals made $1.25, or ten shillings, though in
Virginia a dollar and a quarter meant seven shillings and sixpence.
Americans had to price things in curious fractions, according to the coins available to them.
Goods went for 6 1/4, 12 1/2, 18 3/4, 25, 37 1/2, 50, 62 1/2, and 75 cents. Things cost $1
1/4 or $5 7/8.
JASON GOODWIN, GREENBACK: THE ALMIGHTY DOLLAR AND THE INVENTION OF AMERICA 124
(2003).
45. 11 Stat. 163 (1857).
46. MARKHAM, supra note 14, at 270-71. In 1864, Congress prohibited futures trading
in gold but this only caused the price of gold to rise against the Greenback and the
legislation was repealed two weeks after its enactment. Id.
47. Id.
48. MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD 99-115 (1986).
49. MARKHAM, supra note 14, at 339-49.
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concerns over risks caused by fluctuations in foreign exchange rates in
commercial transactions because gold would be exchanged for gold in
settling foreign debts.50
The specie debate was long running and contentious, even giving rise
to political parties. A specie standard was opposed by farmer organizations
that sought to inflate the currency and thereby inflate commodity prices. In
contrast, commercial interests sought to call in paper currency and return to
a more stable gold standard. A subset of this debate was an effort to treat
silver more favorably than gold, which would inflate prices because of its
greater supply.51 The Supreme Court entered the fray through the so-called
legal tender cases, which gave conflicting rulings on whether greenbacks
were required to be accepted as legal tender by anyone other than the
federal government. Broad legal tender status was eventually recognized
by the Court.52
The Resumption Act of 1875 declared that it was the intention of the
federal government to resume specie as the standard for legal tender.
However, a “free Silver” movement and the “Greenback” or “National”
party continued to fight that resumption. They supported the Silver
Coinage Act of 1878, which required the Treasury to buy and coin silver
that could be used as collateral for silver certificates that would circulate as
currency. Congress also voted to reduce the amount of outstanding
greenbacks, which brought them to par with gold for the first time. This
debate over the role of gold and silver gave rise to one of the most famous
political speeches in American history—the so-called “Cross of Gold”
speech by William Jennings Bryan in 1896.53 Despite his rhetoric, Bryan
lost the presidential race and the argument. The United States also went on

50. For example, when the United States and England were both on a gold standard, “a
bank deposit in New York [wa]s equivalent to gold tendered in New York, while a bank
deposit in London [wa]s equivalent to gold tendered in London.” YORK, supra note 2 at 1.
51. See generally, GOODWIN, supra note 46, at 255-84 (describing these political
issues).
52. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71 (1868); Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U.S. 229 (1868);
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870).
53. Bryan famously stated in this speech that:
[H]aving behind us the producing masses of the nation and the world. . . the
commercial interests and the laboring interests and all the toiling masses, we
shall answer their demands for a gold standard by saying to them, you shall not
press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns. You shall not crucify
mankind upon a cross of gold.
William Jennings Bryan, Speech at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago: Cross
of Gold (July 9, 1896), http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5354/ [https://perma.cc/3BSRGHWD].
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a gold standard in 1900 with the passage of the Gold Standard Act.54
The adoption of a gold standard here and abroad helped to stabilize
exchange rates among the countries adopting that standard, which included
a majority of nations.55 “During the gold standard, exchange rates were
generally quite stable and anchored by arbitrage of gold versus currencies
pegged to gold.”56 Gold might still fluctuate in value between two foreign
markets on the gold standard when there was an imbalance of supply and
demand in one market.57 However, the risks from such fluctuations could
be hedged.58 Speculators and arbitrageurs could also profit from such
differences, but profits were limited to the cost of transporting gold to the
market with an imbalance.59
The gold standard fell apart in 1914 with the outbreak of World War I,
which caused the warring nations to fall out of a fixed rate regimen.60
For a short time conditions in the Foreign Exchange markets became
chaotic. The interruption of relations with enemy countries made it
impossible to carry out the large number of foreign-exchange contracts
entered into before the war, and it became difficult to carry out a further
large number of contracts whose execution depended and turned on the
execution of contracts with enemy countries.61
Efforts were made to stabilize sterling by pegging operations of the
government and other measures,62 but in “neutral markets the exchanges of

54. Jerry W. Markham, Gold Standard Act of 1900, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3407400146.html [https://perma.cc/P3T2-9UMP]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015). The Wizard of Oz was written as an allegory of the fight over
the gold standard. William Jennings Bryan was portrayed as the cowardly lion.
WEATHERFORD, supra note 15, at 174-77.
55. Michael D. Bordo, Gold Standard, LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GoldStandard.html
[https://perma.cc/5G7C-XWHK]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
56. Scott Mixon, The Foreign Exchange Option Market, 1917-1921 5 (Jan. 26, 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1333442 [https://perma.cc/S9P3-JCNL].
57. YORK, supra note 2, at 21-22 (1920).
58. Id. at 53-54.
59. Id. at 24-25. As one source described this speculation:
They will purchase exchange with money borrowed in New York and loan out
the funds in the London market. Subsequently, when their advances mature,
they will recall their funds by selling exchange, and at the same time retire their
borrowings and New York. They may also speculate by purchasing exchange
for future delivery.
Id. at 24.
60. Mixon, supra note 57.
61. EINZIG, supra note 10, at 236.
62. The U.S. dollar was pegged to the British pound at a set rate during the war. JERRY
W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM J.P. MORGAN TO THE
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900-1970) 73 (2002).
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belligerent fluctuated freely, and there was a great deal of speculation.”63
In 1919, after the conclusion of World War I, government pegging
operations ended, including those by the United States and the value of the
British pound and French franc dropped sharply.64 Exchange rates
“witnessed wild and entirely incalculable fluctuations, and speculation
figured prominently both as a cause and as an effect of these
fluctuations.”65 This period saw an evolution in the foreign exchange
markets; telegraphic transfers replaced bills of exchange and a spot and
forward market in actual currency emerged.”.66 “Anecdotal evidence from
contemporaries suggests that currency trading became a substantial activity
starting in the 1920s, as speculators sought to exploit the new profit
opportunities associated with floating exchange rates.”67
This period of floating currency exchange rates during the 1920s was
“remarkable for its great turbulence due to the political and economic
conditions that existed in Europe at the time.”68
The rapid and
unprecedented depreciation of the German mark has been well
documented, as has the devastating inflation experienced by that country.69
Many blamed that inflation on speculators in the currency, rather than on
the government policies and war related claims that were the actual cause.70
There were also “concerted speculative attacks on various currencies, most
63. EINZIG, supra note 10, at 237.
64. BARRY EICHENGREEN, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE GREAT
DEPRESSION, 1919-1939 100 (1995).
65. Id.
66. Olivier Accominotti & David Chambers, If You’re So Smart: The Currency
Trading
Record
of
John
Maynard
Keynes
(Sept.
2014),
http://www.cepr.org/sites/default/files/Accominotti%20%20Chambers_IfYou'reSoSmart_20Sep2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY7D-TUZS].
67. Id. at 1.
68. Richard T. Baillie & Young-Wook Han, Central Bank Intervention and Properties
of
the
1920s
Currency
Markets
(Apr.
2002),
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB4QFjA
A&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cb.cityu.edu.hk%2FEF%2FgetFileWorkingPaper.cfm%3Fi
d%3D279&ei=iykMVfzUGMP4gwSegoJw&usg=AFQjCNG_pRz49aTTA7ALVbdzW4eIv
ThAvA&sig2=hAj53OZZ5R6UM2_DPi7s5w&bvm=bv.88528373,d.eXY
[https://perma.cc/KU7Y-XVJX].
69. See Germany’s Hyperinflation-Phobia, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 2013
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/11/economic-history-1
[https://perma.cc/7T4G-4DSF] (accessed on March 20, 2015) (describing that hyperinflation
and the fears that it continues to raise in Germany).
70. Robert L. Hetzel, German Monetary History in the First Half of the Twentieth
Century,
at
11
(2002)
https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2002/winter/pdf/he
tzel.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8MY-BDMV] (accessed on March 21, 2015). Germany ended its
hyperinflation in 1923 by pegging the mark to the dollar at the then prevailing exchange rate
of 4,200 billion marks to the dollar. Id. at p. 8.
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notably the French franc, which in turn prompted the French Government
to engage in a number of ‘bear squeezes’ in the hope of deterring future
speculation.”71
The business of foreign exchange grew rapidly in the United States
after the conclusion of World War I. By 1920, the Wall Street Journal was
carrying a column on “Foreign Exchange” that analyzed causes of currency
price fluctuations and carried price quotes for several European and South
American currencies.72 Brokers were advertising their foreign exchange
operations. For example, the Park Union Foreign Banking Corporation in
New York advertised in the New York Times in 1921 that it had $22 million
in resources and that its “Foreign Exchange Department [was] taking care
of the foreign exchange business in sterling, francs, lire and marks, as well
as Scandinavian, Central European and Far Eastern exchange for over two
hundred banks within the United States, for many foreign banks and
commercial firms.”73 Another New York firm, Morton Lachenbruch &
Co., advertised that large profits could be made from the purchase of
foreign bonds “because they rise in Dollar Value in proportion to exchange
rates.”74 The American Express Company made similar claims.75
Options trading was a popular tool for speculation in foreign currency
in the United States. Retail German-American investors were particular
targets of firms hawking options on the German mark.76 Options were also
sold on the Russian ruble.77 These options on foreign exchange were often
sold “at prices too exorbitant to attract any but the uninformed . . .”78 The
exploitation of retail foreign currency investors involved other frauds,
including one of the most notorious financial scandals in all history—that
of Charles Ponzi.79 His scheme promised small investors, usually Italian
immigrants, quarterly profits of fifty percent through the purchase of postal
reply coupons in Europe using European currencies. Ponzi claimed that
these postal certificates would be redeemed in other currencies at favorable

71. Richard T. Baillie, Tim Bollerslev & Michael R. Redfearn, Bear Squeezes,
Volatility Spillovers and Speculative Attacks in the Hyperinflation 1920s Foreign Exchange,
12 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 511, 512 (1993).
72. See, e.g., Foreign Exchange, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1920, at 12; Foreign Exchange,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1922, at 4 (describing the causes for fluctuations in price for foreign
currencies).
73. Advertisement for Park-Union, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 1921) at 27.
74. Advertisement for Morton Lachenbruch & Co., N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 1921) at 30.
75. Rise in Exchanges Aiding Bond Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1921, at 29.
76. Mixon, supra note 57, at 2-3.
77. Id.
78. Piratical Practices in Field of Foreign Exchange, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1922, at 4.
79. See MITCHELL ZUCKOFF, PONZI’S SCHEME (2005) (describing this fraud).
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exchange rates.80 In actuality, Ponzi was simply paying his investors
“profits” from their own funds and those of new investors.81
The Wall Street Journal reported in 1922 that other Ponzi-like
schemes were occurring in foreign exchange transactions directed at ethnic
groups in Chicago. One operator was conducting “blind pool and exchange
operation[s], so-called dividends on which actually come from the deposits
of constantly recruited ‘investors’. . . .”82 Another form of fraud on
unsophisticated investors was reported to have involved “the sale of
counterfeit foreign currencies, or money worthless because a foreign
government or bank of issue had given notice that within a certain period,
since elapsed, it must be presented to be stamped or exchanged.”83
“Bucketing” was another fraud practiced on foreign exchange
customers. This occurred when currency or foreign bonds were sold for
cash or on a partial payment plan. The buyer was “told that his money
must go to Europe and he is put off on one pretext or another or until the
dealer is able to buy at a much better price or simply closes his office.”84
Many of the victims of this practice were unsophisticated, but many banks
and money brokers located outside the New York foreign exchange market
were targeted as well.85 The National City Bank also suffered $5 million

80. See BARRY EICHENGREEN, HALL OF MIRRORS 17-18 (2015) (describing this
arbitrage opportunity).
81. The Supreme Court described Ponzi’s scheme as follows:
In December, 1919, with a capital of $150, he began the business of borrowing
money on his promissory notes. He did not profess to receive money for
investment for account of the lender. He borrowed the money on his credit
only. He spread the false tale that on his own account he was engaged in
buying international postal coupons in foreign countries and selling them in
other countries at 100 per cent. profit, and that this was made possible by the
excessive differences in the rates of exchange following the war. He was
willing, he said, to give others the opportunity to share with him this profit. By
a written promise in 90 days to pay them $150 for every $100 loaned, he
induced thousands to lend him. He stimulated their avidity by paying his 90day notes in full at the end of 45 days, and by circulating the notice that he
would pay any unmatured note presented in less than 45 days at 100 per cent. of
the loan. Within eight months he took in $9,582,000, for which he issued his
notes for $14,374,000. He paid his agents a commission of 10 per cent. With
the 50 per cent. promised to lenders, every loan paid in full with the profit
would cost him 60 per cent. He was always insolvent, and became daily more
so, the more his business succeeded. He made no investments of any kind, so
that all the money he had at any time was solely the result of loans by his dupes.
Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1924).
82. Piratical Practices in Field of Foreign Exchange, supra note 80.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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loss in Brazil from exchange operations conducted by a rogue trader.86
The spectacular failure of a foreign exchange firm in 1923 illustrated
the growth and dangers of the foreign exchange market. That firm, Knauth,
Nachod & Kuhne, was a member of the New York Stock Exchange and
had been in business for seventy years. Its demise was attributed to the
depreciation of the German mark.87 That failure was followed by the
bankruptcy of another New York Stock Exchange member, Zimmerman &
Forshay, which was dealing in German and other foreign securities.88 The
German currency was certainly suffering that year. Reports in August
1923 indicated that the German mark was trading at the rate of “6,666,666
marks to the dollar.”89
Despite these problems, the foreign exchange market in New York
was recognized as a force in the financial community. Market commentary
on foreign currency fluctuations continued to be regularly reported in the
papers.90 For example, on December 13, 1924, the New York Times noted
that:
Activity in the foreign exchanges was greater with a considerable
increase in speculative dealing, which caused irregular
movements in a few currencies. Market opened with sterling and
most of the smaller continentals lower, and heavy sales of
sterling, francs and guilders from London during early half of the
session caused further declines.91
In 1925, New York amended its Martin Act, a state law that had been
originally aimed at conventional stock and bond fraud schemes, to cover
foreign currency orders and options.92 Such legislation was necessary. At
about the time of the passage of this amendment to the Martin Act,
investors gave thousands of dollars to Louis Franko, who was operating in
New York and offering investments in Italian lire in foreign exchange.
Franko simply kept the money, but unfortunately for him one of the
defrauded investors was a former sheriff of Scranton, Pennsylvania, and he
had Franko arrested.93

86. MARKHAM, supra note 63, at 112 (2002).
87. Big Banking Firm, 70 Years in Street, Fails for $12,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
1923, at 1.
88. Old Banking House, Ex-German Agents, Fails for $7,500,000, N.Y. TIMES, June
21, 1923, at 1.
89. Foreign Exchange, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1923, at 4.
90. Stocks Again Up, Led By the Rails, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1924, at 8.
91. Foreign Exchange, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1924, at 8.
92. Starts a New War on Stock Swindles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1925, at 6.
93. Seized as Swindler in Foreign Money, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1926, at 3.
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D. The Gold Standard and Bretton Woods
In 1924, there was speculation that Europe would return to a golden
basis.94 Great Britain returned to the gold standard in 1925,95 and was
followed by the rest of Europe in the next two years.96 However, gold
began flowing to the United States from London in 1928 when the Federal
Reserve Board began raising interest rates. This disrupted efforts to
maintain a gold standard with the European nations.97
The Great Depression led the German Reichsbank to limit foreign
exchange “to ‘cases of vital necessity’”98 and England to abandon the gold
standard in 1931.99 America followed in 1933 with the election of Franklin
Roosevelt. Roosevelt used his first inaugural address to vilify the “money
changers,” although that pejorative seemed to have been directed at bankers
in general.100 In the event, Roosevelt had Congress create an Exchange
Stabilization Fund that could be used to manipulate the dollar against other
currencies. That Fund was also used to bail out Mexico in 1995 and to
guarantee the money market funds during the Financial Crisis in 2008.101
The Gold Act of 1934 nationalized private gold stocks at an artificially
low price.102 That action should provide an object lesson to modern
investors who seek to invest in gold as a hedge against inflation. Private
owners of gold were forced by the Gold Act to sell at a price of $20.60 per
ounce, which was well below the level of $35 per ounce to which it was
later inflated by Roosevelt.103
The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 repealed the Gold Standard Act of
1900, which meant that U.S. currency was no longer redeemable in gold.104

94. Foreign Exchange, supra note 90, at 8.
95. BERNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 291-292.
96. Hetzel, supra note 71, at 12-13 (2002).
97. Id. at 13. See also, LIAQUAT AHAMED, LORDS OF FINANCE 225-235 (2009)
(describing Britain’s return to the gold standard).
98. EICHENGREEN, supra note 81, at 147.
99. MARKHAM, supra note 63, at 191.
100. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the U.S., Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14473 [https://perma.cc/3M4T-QVR8].
Roosevelt also stated in that address:
The money changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our
civilization. We may now restore that temple to the ancient truths. The measure
of the restoration lies in the extent to which we apply social values more noble
than mere monetary profit.
Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.

BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT 301-302 (2015).
MARKHAM, supra note 63, at 191-194.
Id. at 191-192.
Id. at 193.
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Congress also declared that private contract provisions for payment in gold
were void.105 The Silver Purchase Act of 1934 sought additionally to
inflate silver prices.106 Congress created a $2 billion fund to stabilize
exchange rates, and the government used that authority in 1935 to stop a
run on the French franc in 1935.107
The outbreak of World War II in 1939 resulted in a devaluation of the
British pound, and the foreign exchange market came to a near standstill
during the war.108 Once it was clear that the war was won, England and the
United States led the effort to create a stable monetary system through the
so-called Bretton Woods agreement.109 This arrangement pegged currency
prices of participating nations to the dollar, which in turn was pegged to
gold at a price of $35 per ounce.110
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), created to act as a lender to
countries that needed funding to maintain the stability of their currencies,111
had to deal with various post-war economic crises that involved, among
others, the massive devaluation of the British pound in 1949.112 There were
other problems that eventually led to the abandonment of the Bretton
Woods currency stabilization structure. Beginning late in the 1950s, gold
began to leave the United States in “the American gold crisis . . . in great
part the result of American expenditures for European recovery and
defense.”113 Those trade imbalances and then inflation led to an attack on
the dollar in which U.S. currency was exchanged for gold at the U.S.

105. Id. at 191-192. The government built the gold depository at Fort Knox, Kentucky
to hold the gold stocks purchased under this program. Id. at 195.
106. Id. at p. 194-195.
107. Id. at p. 193-194.
108. See EINZIG, supra note 10, at 227 (“During the second World War stability of
exchange rates was maintained in most countries through a complete suspension of dealings
and the adoption of advanced exchange control.”).
109. BERNSTEIN, supra 41, at 331. As one author has noted:
The plans for a new international economic system were worked out by 730
delegates from 44 countries who gathered in the White Mountain resort of
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944. Most of the final design came from
John Maynard Keynes, representing the British Treasury, and his counterpart,
Harry White of the US Treasury Department.
Id. John Maynard Keynes had been among those speculating in the foreign exchange
market after World War I. 2 ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIST
AS SAVIOUR, 1920-1937, at 41 (1992).
110. BERNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 332.
111. MARKHAM, supra note 63, at 276.
112. Id.
113. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR. A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE
HOUSE 653 (2002).
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Treasury, sharply depleting America’s gold stocks.114 U.S. gold stocks
dropped from $22 billion to $17 billion between 1958 and 1960.115
President John F. Kennedy prohibited Americans from holding gold abroad
and sought to limit foreign investments by Americans.116 Those and other
efforts were unsuccessful. Several efforts were also made to maintain gold
at $35 per ounce, including the formation of a gold pool by eight European
countries in 1960 that sought to support the dollar.117
“[B]y 1955, current account convertibility was largely established de
facto; at the end of 1958 it was publicly announced. . . . [C]onvertibility
was the final stage of liberalization, which ensured that consumers could
achieve the maximum satisfaction . . . by being able to trade at world
prices.”118 Commercial firms engaged in international business and
wealthy individuals began maintaining working balances in foreign
currencies to meet operational needs and to satisfy their “speculative
instincts.”119 Speculators began trading in foreign currencies and gold in
anticipation of devaluations. In 1960, speculators were buying and selling
gold at $40 per ounce, while the U.S. was selling it for $35 per ounce.120
In 1963, Fortune magazine noted that individuals had become
interested in hedging and speculating on the devaluation of the dollar. The
article also noted that banks were “apt to acquiesce readily enough when
one of their important customers indicates firmly that he wants to speculate
in foreign exchange.”121 At that time foreign exchange contracts traded in
this so-called “interbank market” were “similar to the standard commodityfutures contract,” which did not include any intent of making or taking
delivery of the underlying foreign currency that was being exchanged.122
Small speculators did not have access to the interbank currency market but
sometimes used their stockbrokers as intermediaries with the large banks.123
By 1968, American gold stocks were down to $12.4 billion and

114. MARKHAM, supra note 63, at 326.
115. 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE
AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM, 1970-2001, at 36 (2002).
116. SCHLESINGER JR., supra note 114, at 510.
117. Id.
118. C. Fred Bergsten & John Williamson, Currency Convertibility in Eastern Europe,
43
Fed.
Reserve
Bank
of
Kansas
City
(1990),
https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/1990/S90BERGS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NC6Q-HXSL] (last visited Mar. 3 2016).
119. Id.
120. MARKHAM, supra note 63, at 326.
121. Daniel Seligman, T.A. Wise & Carol J, Loomis, Personal Investing, FORTUNE, Feb.
1963, at 201.
122. Id. at 202.
123. Id. at 201.
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falling.124 The run on gold was not halted until August 15, 1971, when
President Richard M. Nixon took America off the gold standard. The
president closed the gold window and announced that the U.S. would no
longer honor the Bretton Woods pledge to peg the price of gold at $35 per
ounce.125 This action was called the “Nixon shock” and within a few years
the dollar was floating against other currencies at exchange rates set by the
market.126
Governments, nevertheless, periodically intervened to manipulate
their currencies. For example, in the 1980s, the dollar appreciated sharply
against other currencies, which hurt U.S. exports. This led to the so-called
“Plaza Accord” in 1985; that agreement was entered into by the U.S.,
Japan, West Germany, France and England after the dollar had depreciated
by almost 50 percent.127
Another example of government intervention was the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) that was created in 1979 by members of the European
Community, predecessor to the European Union. The ERM was a joint
effort by European Community countries to stabilize their currency
exchange rates against each other, while floating against other currencies.
This was a precursor to the introduction of the euro in 1999,128 which
sought to eliminate currency risk in transactions occurring among
businesses in the European Union.129 The ERM was not entirely
successful. England was forced from that arrangement after speculators
attacked its currency in 1992. Those speculators “borrowed UK gilts only
to sell them and buy them back later at cheaper prices. They repeated the
trick every few minutes, making a profit each time.”130 One of those
speculators, George Soros’ Quantum Fund, made an estimated 1 billion
pounds from such trading.131

124. MARKHAM, supra note 116, at 36-37.
125. Id. at 38.
126. Id. at 38-39.
127. THOLOOR M. THOMAS, BULL RUN 11 (2013).
128. Econ 355: European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), AM. UNIV. OF BULG
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&ved=0CE4QFjA
G&url=http%3A%2F%2Fhome.aubg.bg%2Ffaculty%2Fdidar%2FEUR324%2FEuropean%
2520Exchange%2520Rate%2520Mechanism%2528ERM%2529.doc&ei=m9c8VZWmK9D
jsATij4C4DQ&usg=AFQjCNE6reCAL3Uzz99VbyI3_G6fSqsNw&sig2=okjGd8ZwVr0wgkk-gldqRg [https://perma.cc/BZC5-H6H7] (last visited Apr.
26, 2015).
129. EICHENGREEN, supra note 81, at 71.
130. Philip Inman, Black Wednesday 20 Years On: How the Day Unfolded, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/sep/13/blackwednesday-20-years-pound-erm [https://perma.cc/2D6L-SG36].
131. Id.
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Governments continue to intervene in the currency markets.132 “In the
modern era, a country trying to manage its exchange rates typically buys or
sells its currency in the market, or uses capital controls or other regulations
to restrict its use. Such practices are still common among emerging
markets, notably China.”133 Most recently, Greece’s economic problems
have threatened its ability to stay in the euro zone and the European Central
Bank intervened to prop up banks in that country.134
II.

REGULATION OF THE INTERBANK CURRENCY MARKET

A. Growth of the Market
Prior to the Nixon shock, an interbank foreign exchange market was
operating, “but it was an exclusive club that operated in the shadows of
international high finance.”135 The banks trading in this market bought and
sold currencies off the official exchange rates “at slight fluctuations among
themselves or for their big commercial customers, locking the public out of
the market.”136 However, within a few years after the breakdown of
Bretton Woods, the banks developed a more sophisticated interbank
foreign exchange market.
Many of the larger banks created separate divisions or foreign
exchange departments staffed with personnel that specialized in making
markets in currencies. Those banks executed transactions for large multi-

132. For example, the European Union created an ERM II in 1999, which sought to
“ensure that exchange rate fluctuations between the euro and other EU currencies do not
disrupt economic stability within the single market, and to help non euro-area countries
prepare themselves for participation in the euro area.” What is ERM II?, EUROPEAN COMM’N
(July 23, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/erm2/index_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/GQJ5-Y67B].
133. Greg Ip, Currencies Gyrate, But There’s No War, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/currencies- gyrate- but- theres- no- war- 1426094448
[https://perma.cc/T24L-GKFR]. In 2015, the U.S. entered into a pact with several Pacific
Rim countries that sought to deter currency manipulations done for the purpose of
benefitting trade. 12 Pacific Rim Countries Sign Pact to End Currency Manipulation, INT’L
BUS. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.in/12-pacific-rim-countries-sign-pactend-currency-manipulation-653611 [https://perma.cc/9XAF-GVY8].
134. Spiegel & Jones, supra note 133. The Chinese government devalued its currency,
the yuan, sharply beginning on August 10, 2015, which makes imports into that country
more expensive and exports cheaper. This raised concerns over trade wars. Lingling Wei,
China
Moves
to
Devalue
Yuan,
WALL ST. J. (Aug.
11,
2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-moves-to-devalue-the-yuan-1439258401
[https://perma.cc/6DT3-TGZ2].
135. LEO MELAMED, ESCAPE TO THE FUTURES 170 (1996).
136. Id.
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national corporations, other banks and speculators.137 This market grew
rapidly because “[f]oreign-exchange dealings no longer concerned just the
multinational companies, the biggest banks, and the wealthiest individuals.
Anybody doing business handling money on an international basis is
affected.”138 Individuals and companies sought to protect their assets, and
speculators sought a profit.139
A sophisticated payment system developed to facilitate transactions in
the interbank foreign exchange market. The Clearing House Interbank
Payments System (CHIPS) was created just before the Nixon shock to act
as “an electronic payments system that transfers funds and settles
transactions in U.S. dollars. CHIPS enables banks to transfer and settle
international payments more quickly by replacing official bank checks with
electronic bookkeeping entries.”140 “Historically, CHIPS specialized in
settling the dollar portion of foreign exchange transactions, and CHIPS
estimates that it now handles 95 percent of all U.S. dollar payments moving
between countries.”141 CHIPS also played an important role in an event
that led to the regulation of the interbank foreign exchange market.
B. Creation of the Basel Committee
“After the collapse of Bretton Woods, many banks incurred large

137. Stewart L. Brown & Dekle Day, Federal Regulation of Foreign Currency Trading
for Future Delivery on Interbank and Futures Markets, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 69, 71-72
(1981).
138. Everybody Plays the Currency Game, BUS. WEEK, May 4, 1974, at 34. As another
source noted:
[F]loating exchange rates permanently destabilized global commerce, creating
artificial advantages and real losses almost at random. Currency values were
pushed back and forth in unpredictable ways that no business executive could
reasonably foresee. Every multinational corporation became, perforce, a
gambler in currency markets.
WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE 339 (1987).
139. Id.
140. CHIPS,
N.Y.
FED.
RESERVE
BANK
(Apr.
2002),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed36.html
[https://perma.cc/WE4A8XFY]. As described by one court:
The New York Clearing House Association (“Clearing House”) maintains
computer facilities and implements techniques for the transfer of funds among
its member banks. In June, 1974 the Clearing House was using the Clearing
House Interbank Payments System (“CHIPS”), a computerized interbank
system for the transfer of funds involving international customers of Clearing
House member banks.
Delbrueck & Co. v. Mfr. Hanover Trust Co., 464 F. Supp. 989, 992 (S.D. N.Y. 1979).
141. CHIPS, supra note 142.
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foreign currency losses.”142 One of the more spectacular of those losses
occurred at the Bankhaus Herstatt in West Germany on June 28, 1974. Its
failure from some $200 million in foreign currency exchange losses
touched off an international banking crisis.143 Because of time differences,
U.S. banks had made their daily payments through CHIPS to Bankhaus
Herstatt but had not received their exchange payments from that bank
before its failure, which meant that they would only have a claim in
bankruptcy for their reciprocal payments. This time gap between
settlement payments became known as the “Herstatt risk;” banks using the
CHIPS payment system then refused, for a time, to make further payments
through that system for fear that they would not receive reciprocal payment
should a counterparty bank fail.144 The failure of the Franklin National
Bank in the U.S. at about the same time as the Herstatt debacle raised
further concerns over foreign exchange transactions. At that time, the
Franklin National Bank was the largest bank failure in U.S. history. Its
collapse was due in large measure to $47 million in losses from foreign
exchange trading.145
The failure of Franklin National and Bankhaus Herstatt led to an
international effort to regulate the interbank foreign currency market.146
This regulation was coordinated through the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (Basel Committee) that was created by the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) in 1974.147 The Basel Committee “has its
origins in the financial market turmoil that followed the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates in 1973.”148
“In response to these and other disruptions in the international
financial markets, the central bank governors of the G10 [Group of Ten]
countries established a Committee on Banking Regulations and
Supervisory Practices at the end of 1974”149 which was later renamed the

142. A Brief History of the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6DK-C924] (last visited Apr. 21,
2015).
143. The failure of “a small German bank sent shock waves through the system, costing
banks from New York to Singapore some $620 million in losses.” Gergana Koleva, ‘Icon of
Systemic Risk’ Haunts Industry Decades After Demise, AM. BANKER (June 23, 2011),
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/bankhaus-herstatt-icon-of-systemic-risk1039312-1.html [https://perma.cc/LJS9-LU3H].
144. MARKHAM, supra note 116, at 20.
145. Id. at 19-20.
146. Determination of Foreign Exchange Swaps and Foreign Exchange Forwards under
the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 69694, 69703 (Nov. 20, 2012).
147. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 144.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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“Basel Committee on Banking Supervision . . . .”150 The Basel Committee
created a supervising agreement called the “‘Concordant’”151 that set
supervisory procedures for international banks. “The Concordat set out
principles for sharing supervisory responsibility for banks’ foreign
branches, subsidiaries and joint ventures between host and parent (or home)
supervisory authorities.”152
C. Settlement Risks
In 1980, the G10 countries created a “Group of Experts on Payment
Systems.”153 This group conducted a review of the payment systems in the
G10 countries and published its findings in 1983 in what were called “Red
Books.”154 Those Red Books provided a comprehensive description of the
payment, clearing and settlement systems of numerous countries.155 In
1989, the G10 countries created a Committee on Interbank Netting
Schemes (CINS). That committee published a report in 1990 that set forth
“minimum standards for the operation of bilateral and multilateral crossborder and multicurrency netting schemes and sets out the G10 central
banks’ framework for the cooperative oversight of such systems.”156 In
1990, the G10 countries created the Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems, which was later renamed the Committee on Payments and Market
Infrastructures (CPMI).157
This permanent committee oversees
international payment systems. It is also a member of the Financial
Stability Board (FSB), the successor to the Financial Stability Forum. The
Group of Twenty countries gave the FSB an expanded role after the
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. This did not stop problems in the foreign exchange market. In 1975, a
whistleblower at Citibank claimed that a senior currency trader was taking kickbacks and
that the bank was parking profits from currency trading in the Bahamas in order to evade
U.S. taxes. Eric Dash, Edwin Edwards, 62, Figure in Citibank Currency Case, Dies, N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
29,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/29/business/29EDWARDS.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0
[https://perma.cc/QQ57-BAC6] (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). At the time, Citibank was
conducting about ten percent of the world’s foreign exchange transactions, and by 1978 the
bank was earning over $100 million from that trading. PHILLIP L. ZWEIG, WRISTON 605
(1995). The whistleblower’s allegations resulted in eight years of investigations by Congress
and the Securities and Exchange Commission but no wrongdoing was ever charged. See
MARKHAM, supra note 116, at 65 (describing these events).
153. About the CPMI, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (Sept. 1, 2014),
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/info.htm?m=3%7C16%7C2 [https://perma.cc/6S9E-ETUJ].
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. The membership in this committee later expanded to twenty-five countries. Id.
157. Id.
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Financial Crisis of 2008. It is now broadly tasked with coordinating and
promoting more effective regulatory and supervisory policies in the entire
financial sector.158
U.S. regulators were also focusing on foreign exchange operations by
banks. A 1989 Banking Circular issued by the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) advised the banks it regulated that they must make
periodic risk assessments of their international payment systems. This
Circular also noted that international payment systems posed risks in
various forms, including operational reliability, liquidity and the credit
quality of counterparties.159
Still, problems surfaced periodically in the interbank foreign currency
market. The failure of Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990 caused concern
with the foreign exchange operations of a London affiliate of that brokerdealer.160 The Bank of England intervened and created a facility for the
settlement of that affiliate’s foreign exchange transactions. The Bank of
England essentially acted as an escrow agent to ensure that the parties on
both sides of those trades would be paid.161 The failure of the BCCI SA
bank in 1991 caused losses to foreign exchange counterparties. A London
foreign exchange counterparty lost a large sum because of a delay in a
settlement payment from BCCI due to a U.S. holiday. The London
counterparty paid, but during the delay, BCCI failed and its counter
payment was canceled. A large Japanese bank also suffered losses because
it paid on a foreign exchange transaction with a BCCI affiliate but did not
receive a counter payment before BCCI failed, which caused its accounts to
be frozen.162
Political problems in the Soviet Union caused further disruptions in
1991. An attempted coup d’état created uncertainty as to the ability of
some Soviet Union financial institutions to perform on their foreign
exchange contracts. This disruption was only temporary, however, because
the counterparties were able, with some assistance from government
authorities, to reach a resolution with the Soviet institutions.163 The
bankruptcy of Baring Brothers in 1995 also temporarily disrupted foreign
158. Our
History,
FINANCIAL
STABILITY
BOARD
(2016),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history/ [https://perma.cc/R8VT-DPNM].
159. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, BANKING
ISSUANCE (1989).
160. Gabriele Galati, Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Markets and CLS Bank, BIS
QUARTERLY REVIEW, Dec. 2002, at 56.
161. COMMITTEE ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF
THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES, SETTLEMENT RISK IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE OPERATIONS 6
(1996).
162. Id. at 7.
163. Id. at 7-8.
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currency settlements in Europe.164
In order to reduce the foreign exchange settlement risks that leave a
counterparty exposed to the risk of the failure of its opposing party, a group
of large banks formed the CLS Bank International in 2002.165 The CLS
Bank seeks to reduce this so-called “Herstatt risk” by requiring
simultaneous settlement payments by each party to a foreign exchange
transaction, i.e., delivery-versus-payment.166
Bank regulators continued to strengthen the supervision of foreign
exchange operations. In September 2000, the Basel Committee provided
supervisory guidance for managing settlement risk in foreign exchange
operations.167 It noted that settlement risks from foreign currency exchange
involved “daily exposures of tens of billions of dollars for the largest
banks. Most significantly, for banks of any size, the amount at risk to even
a single counterparty could in some cases exceed their capital.”168 Among
other things, this report noted that supervision of settlement risks should be
carried out by the highest levels of bank management with supervision
from the bank’s board of directors.169
Despite the creation of the CLS Bank, settlement risk remained. A
2008 report by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems found
that 32 percent of foreign exchange transactions surveyed by the committee
were done outside the CLS Bank. These settlements were done through
traditional correspondent banking relationships, and half of those

164. Id. at 8.
165. About Us, CLS (2015), http://www.cls-group.com/About/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/KC2T-2J8U].
As the CLS Bank noted:
All members of the FX community potentially bear the risk of loss of principal due to
settlement risk. Settlement risk, also known as “Herstatt risk,” is widely recognized as the
most significant systemic risk to participants in the FX market, meaning the mitigation of it
is a high priority for the community as a whole.
Settlement
Risk,
CLS
(2015),
http://www.cls-group.com/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/EB87-6EXE].
166. See Galati, supra note 162, at 56-64 (describing the settlement process that arose
through the CLS after the closure of Bankhaus Herstatt).
169
See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FOR
MANAGING SETTLEMENT RISK IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 1 (2000) (explaining
the purpose of its 2000 report as providing information about settlement risk and
management).
167. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FOR
MANAGING SETTLEMENT RISK IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 1 (2000) (explaining
the purpose of its 2000 report as providing information about settlement risk and
management).
168. Id. at 1.
169. Id. at 3.
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settlements were found to have overnight risk exposure.170 Several
recommendations were made by the committee to reduce that exposure,
including greater use of bilateral netting arrangements that would reduce
gross exposures.171
Still more guidance was provided by the Basel Committee in 2012 for
managing risks associated with settlement of foreign exchange
settlements.172 Those risks were identified as “principal risk, replacement
cost risk, liquidity risk, operational risk and legal risk.”173 A principal
recommendation was the reduction of settlement risks by delivery-versuspayment systems.174 Concerns remained with respect to settlement. In
2013, the New York Federal Reserve Bank demanded that banks provide
better management of foreign currency exchange risks.175
With all this supervision, no one was able to anticipate the surprise
decision of the Swiss government to decouple its currency from the euro in
January 2015. The result was that the Swiss franc increased in value by
nearly forty percent in one day, causing some crippling losses. Everest
Capital Global, a hedge fund, lost a reported $830 million in a single day
after the Swiss franc was decoupled.176 Another large hedge fund,
COMAC, shut down its operations after experiencing large losses from the
Swiss franc.177 FXCM Inc., a U.S. based retail foreign exchange broker,
had to obtain $300 million from an investment firm in order to cover its
losses.178 Citigroup shut down a foreign exchange trading program for

170. Id.
171. Id. at 2.
172. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FOR
MANAGING RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
TRANSACTIONS 3-4 (2012).
173. Id. at 3.
174. Id. This guidance was updated in 2013. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FOR MANAGING RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 3-5 (2013) (providing the 2013
updates).
175. Managing Foreign Exchange Risk, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD BANK OF NEW YORK,
http://www.newyorkfed.org/financial-services-and-infrastructure/financial-marketinfrastructure-and-reform/managing-foreign-exchange/ [https://perma.cc/9XVZ-RPHK].
176. Katherine Burton, Swiss Franc Trade Said to Wipe Out Everest’s Main Fund,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS
(Jan.
18,
2015,
7:02
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-17/swiss-franc-trade-is-said-to-wipe-outeverest-s-main-fund [https://perma.cc/6SGV-QAT2].
177. Brian Portnoy, Hedge Funds and the ‘Swiss Miss’, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2015, 3:36
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/brianportnoy/2015/01/23/hedge-funds-and-the-swissmiss/ [https://perma.cc/3NQU-FQ9W].
178. Ira Iosebashvili, et al., Surge of Swiss Franc Triggers Hundreds of Millions in
Losses, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2015, 7:02 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/swiss-francmove-cripples-currency-brokers-1421371654 [https://perma.cc/SF5Y-TFWK].
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wealthy clients who sustained large losses from the franc revaluation.179
Deutsche Bank lost about $150 million during this event, and Barclays had
large losses.180
D. Swap and Other OTC Instruments in the Interbank Market
The interbank exchange market encompasses a broad range of trading
in cash currency, swaps, options and other derivatives.181 The Dodd-Frank
Act that was passed in 2010 required central clearing for most swaps and
other OTC derivative instruments. Regulators were directed to set margin
requirements for any remaining uncleared OTC swaps or other OTC
derivatives. Capital and margin requirements for uncleared swaps
(including initial and variation margin) for banks were to be set by the
appropriate prudential bank regulator, while the CFTC was given that role
for other entities.182
The Basel Committee worked with the board of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to formulate
requirements for centralized clearing for standardized swaps and margin
requirements for uncleared swaps and other OTC derivatives in which
banks participate as principal.183 However, Dodd-Frank allowed the
Secretary of the Treasury to exempt foreign exchange swaps and forwards
from the definition of “swap” for most Dodd-Frank purposes, including
margin and central clearing requirements.184 The Treasury Secretary made
that determination on November 20, 2012.185 After examining the risks
presented by foreign exchange transactions in the interbank currency
market, the Secretary concluded that the market was already subject to
extensive and coordinated oversight by the largest central bank regulators.

179. Chiara Albanese & Peter Rudegeair, Citigroup Closes Exclusive Credit Program
Following Swiss Franc Losses, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2015, 6:24 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/citigroup-closes-exclusive-credit-program-following-swissfranc-losses-1431599055 [https://perma.cc/P7XE-M749].
180. Iosebashvili, supra note 180.
181. See generally, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, TURNOVER SURVEY 2 (2010) (describing
instruments traded in the interbank currency market).
182. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 731(e)(1)(A)
(2010) (“Each registered swap dealer and major swap participant for which there is a
prudential regulator shall meet such minimum capital requirements and minimum initial and
variation margin requirements as the prudential regulator shall by rule or regulation
prescribe . . . .”).
183. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR NONCENTRALLY CLEARED DERIVATIVES 1 (2012).
184. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 721 (2010)
(defining “swaps” and “foreign exchange swaps”).
185. Dept. of the Treasury, supra note 148, at 69, 694.
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The Secretary specifically cited the operations of the Committee on
Payment and Settlement Systems as providing the needed regulation. The
Secretary also noted that the CLS Bank and the development of deliveryversus - payment arrangements had reduced settlement risks. As a further
protection, the Federal Reserve Board regularly conducts reviews of the
foreign exchange operations of large banks to measure the depth of their
risk assessment programs and operational procedures. That information is
then shared with the Basel Committee for international coordination. The
Secretary believed that this process negated the need for a central clearing
and trading mandate for the interbank currency market.186
E. Fraud and Price Fixing in the Foreign Exchange Interbank Market
1. Introduction
In recent years, several large banks became involved in high profile
scandals involving their manipulation of foreign exchange rates and
defrauding of institutional customers. The market they were accused of
manipulating—the commercial interbank foreign exchange market—was
described as follows:
Currencies are traded in pairs where the seller sells one currency
and buys another, and the price of one currency is expressed in
relation to another currency as a ratio. To initiate an FX
transaction, typically, a customer contacts a dealer bank for a
quote for the relevant currency and quantity. The dealer provides
a “bid,” which is the price at which the dealer is willing to buy
the currency. The dealer also quotes an “ask,” the price at which
the dealer is willing to sell the currency. The difference between
the bid and ask is called the “bid-ask spread,” which is the basis
of the dealer’s compensation. While “dealers are incentivized to
quote wider bid-ask spreads,” competition among them “narrows
bid-ask spreads.” Currencies are commonly traded at published
exchange rates called “fixing rates.” The WM/Reuters published
rates “are the most important fixing rates in the FX markets” and
“the primary benchmark for currency trading globally.” . . .
For the most widely traded currencies, the Fix is determined by
the median price of actual FX transactions in the 30 seconds
before and after 4 p.m. London time (the “Fixing Window”).
The WM Company extracts actual market prices from electronic
communications networks that Defendants use to execute orders

186. Id. at 69, 698.
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for FX instruments, such as Reuters, Currenex and EBS. The
process is automated and anonymous. Trading at the Fix is
popular for many reasons, including reduced tracking error and
the perception of “universality and independence from any
specific dealer.”187
The Justice Department has further described this interbank foreign
exchange market as follows:
The FX Spot Market is an over-the-counter market and, as such,
is decentralized and requires financial institutions to act as
dealers willing to buy or sell a currency. Dealers, also known
throughout the FX Spot Market as market makers, therefore play
a critical role in ensuring the continued functioning of the
market. . . .
A dealer in the FX Spot Market quotes prices at which the dealer
stands ready to buy or sell the currency. These price quotes are
expressed as units of a given currency, known as the “counter”
currency, which would be required to purchase one unit of a
“base” currency, which is often the U.S. dollar and so reflects an
“exchange rate” between the currencies. Dealers generally
provide price quotes to four decimal points, with the final digit
known as a “percentage in point” or “pip.” A dealer may provide
price quotes to potential customers in the form of a “bid/ask
spread,” which represents the difference between the price at
which the dealer is willing to buy the currency from the customer
(the “bid”) and the price at which the dealer is willing to sell the
currency to the customer (the “ask”). A dealer may quote a
spread, or may provide just the bid to a potential customer
inquiring about selling currency or just the ask to a potential
customer inquiring about buying currency.
. . . A customer wishing to trade currency may transact with a
dealer by placing an order through the dealer’s internal,
proprietary electronic trading platform or by contacting the
dealer’s salesperson to obtain a quote. When a customer accepts a
dealer’s quote, that dealer now bears the risk for any change in
the currency’s price that may occur before the dealer is able to
trade with other dealers in the “interdealer market” to fill the
order by buying the currency the dealer has agreed to sell to the
customer, or by selling the currency the dealer has agreed to buy
from the customer. A dealer may also take and execute orders

187. In re Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litigation, 74 F.Supp.3d 581,
586-87 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2015).
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from customers such as “fix orders,” which are orders to trade at
a subsequently determined “fix rate.” When a dealer accepts a fix
order from a customer, the dealer agrees to fill the order at a rate
to be determined at a subsequent fix time based on trading in the
interdealer market. Two such “fixes” used to determine a fix rate
are the European Central Bank fix, which occurs each trading day
at 2:15 PM (CET) and the World Markets/Reuters fix, which
occurs each trading day at 4:00 PM (GMT).188
Before the recent scandals, fraud and manipulation had been rare in
the foreign exchange interbank market, at least in comparison to other
financial markets. Nevertheless, there had been some problems. For
example, the SEC settled a case brought against a former portfolio and
currency manager for Merrill Lynch, who was charged with fraud in
foreign exchange transactions that occurred between 1997 and 2001.189
The defendant allegedly executed foreign customer orders but delayed their
allocation. If the trade turned out profitable at the close of the London
market, the defendant would allocate the trade to the accounts of his
favored customers, even though they had not entered the order. The
disfavored customers received less favorable prices.190
In another instance, the European Commission (EC) fined five
German banks about $90 million for fixing their currency conversion
commissions at about three percent during the transition to the euro starting
in January 1999.191 A large number of other banks and bureau de change
across the eurozone were the target of cartel proceedings by the EC for
similar conduct. Those proceedings were discontinued after the parties
agreed to reduce their commissions significantly.192
In 2002, John Rusnak, a rogue trader in the Baltimore, Maryland
office of an affiliate of Allied Irish Banks, lost $750 million as the result of
unauthorized trades in foreign exchange. Later, Allied Irish Banks came
under investigation by Irish authorities over whether it had been overcharging foreign exchange customers in currency conversions.193

188. Plea Agreement at 4-5, United States v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., (2015).
189. See Gobora, SEC Litigation Release No. 17555 (June 11, 2002),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17555.htm
[https://perma.cc/6BYB-ZRGP]
(summarizing the action taken by the SEC in SEC v. Gobora).
190. Id.
191. EC Competition Committee, Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments
in
European
Commission,
10
(2001),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/2001_annual_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VXB3-3TW3].
192. Id. at 11-12.
193. Helena Keers, AIB Admits Overcharging, THE TELEGRAPH (May 7, 2004),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2884790/AIB-admits-overcharging.html
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In 2003, forty-seven foreign currency traders were charged with
criminal fraud by the U.S. attorney in New York through a sting operation
called operation “Wooden Nickel.” Among other things, the government
charged that the defendants had defrauded large banks through trades
rigged by bank employees to assure profits to non-bank traders, who then
kicked back part of the profits to the bank employees.194 The banks that
were victimized by this conduct included JPMorgan Chase, UBS, and
Société Générale.195
The National Australian Bank, that country’s largest bank and second
largest company, suffered a loss of $458 million from the unauthorized
foreign exchange trading of a rogue employee in 2004.196 As a result of
that loss, the bank’s management was restructured and several employees
were forced to resign, including its CEO and chairman.197
2. The Post Financial Crisis Foreign Currency Scandals
After the Financial Crisis of 2008, several large banks were the targets
of regulators for their banking practices in a successive series of cases that
settled for billions of dollars. The first wave of these scandals involved
abusive mortgage practices. By October 2014, it was estimated that the six
largest U.S. banks had paid $143.2 billion to regulators to settle mortgage
related claims.198 In a second wave of cases, many of the same banks were

[https://perma.cc/C4UA-TXS2].
194. JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE
SCANDALS: FROM ENRON TO REFORM 490 (2006). Kenneth N. Gilpin, 47 Currency Traders
Are
Indicted
on
Fraud
Charges,
N. Y. TIMES (Nov.
19,
2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/19/business/19CND-DOLL.html [https://perma.cc/7C3C6AP3].
195. MARKHAM, supra note 193, at 490.
196. Id. at 496.
197. Heads Roll at NAB Over Foreign Exchange Scandal, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(Mar.
12,
2004),
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/03/12/1078594547046.html
[https://perma.cc/7JTJ-EEAU].
198. Lynnley Browning, Too Big to Tax: Settlements Are Tax Write-offs for Banks,
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/07/giant-penalties-aregiant-tax-write-offs-wall-street-279993.html [https://perma.cc/K7XD-TSDX].
Bank of
America alone has paid some $90 billion to settle government and private claims over
lending practices by the bank and its affiliates. John Maxfield, The Complete List: Bank of
America’s Legal Fines and Settlements Since 2008, THE MOTLEY FOOL, (Oct. 1, 2014, 9:59
AM),
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/10/01/the-complete-list-bank-ofamericas-legal-fines-and.aspx [https://perma.cc/62XG-NMWD].
JPMorgan Chase
contributed $26 billion to that total. Emily Glazer & Patrick Fitzgerald, J.P. Morgan Wins
Legal Battle in WaMu Case, WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-pmorgan-wins-legal-battle-in-washington-mutual-case-1433365003 [https://perma.cc/MV74JAXS].
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charged with manipulating LIBOR and other interest rate benchmarks. The
settlements with regulators in those cases totaled some $9 billion.199 A
third wave of scandals followed by investigations into whether some of
those same large banks had been manipulating foreign exchange rates and
defrauding their institutional clients in foreign exchange transactions. The
government then brought cases against several of those banks, which were
settled in amounts totaling some $10 billion.200 The following is a
description of those foreign exchange related actions.
3. The J.P. Morgan et al. First Settlement
In November 2014, six banks agreed to pay $4.3 billion to settle
claims that they had manipulated the WM/Reuters benchmark currency rate
and improperly shared information about customer orders. The charges in
those actions included a claim that:
Traders at different Banks formed tight knit groups in which
information was shared about client activity, including using
code names to identify clients without naming them. These
groups were described as, for example, “the players”, “the 3
musketeers”, “1 team, 1 dream”, “a co-operative” and “the Ateam”.

199. Jeffrey Vogelli & Hugo Miller, Deutsche Bank Libor Damage Goes Beyond
Record
$2.5
Billion
Fine,
BLOOMBERG
BUS.
(April
23,
2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-23/deutsche-bank-libor-damage-goesbeyond-record-2-5-billion-fine [https://perma.cc/AK37-3PBF]. Two London based traders
were convicted in New York on charges they manipulated LIBOR rates. Christopher M.
Matthews, Jury Delivers First U.S. Libor Manipulation Convictions, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 6,
2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-jury-convicts-former-rabobank-traders-inlibor-trial-1446742694 [https://perma.cc/4FG5-9QVK]. A trader in London was found
guilty of manipulating Libor rates by an English jury, but six other traders were found not
guilty of such charges in a separate trial. Chad Bray, Sixth Ex-Broker Cleared in London
Libor
Trial,
N.
Y.
TIMES,
(Jan.
28,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/29/business/dealbook/sixth-ex-broker-cleared-in-londonlibor-trial.html [https://perma.cc/T2XC-2E7U].
200. See, e.g., Chiara Albanese, David Enrich & Katie Martin, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan
Take Brunt of Currencies Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-reach-settlement-in-foreign-exchange-rigging-probe1415772504 [https://perma.cc/SY5E-HJ8F] (summarizing some of the relative fines doled
out by various U.S. regulators to each of the major banks); see also, Michael Corkery & Ben
Protess, 5 Big Banks to Pay Billions and Plead Guilty in Currency and Interest Rate Cases,
N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/business/dealbook/5-bigbanks-to-pay-billions-and-plead-guilty-in-currency-and-interest-rate-cases.html
[https://perma.cc/4TTU-ALH6] (describing more settlements between banks and
regulators).
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Traders shared the information obtained through these groups to
help them work out their trading strategies. They then attempted
to manipulate fix rates and trigger client “stop loss” orders
(which are designed to limit the losses a client could face if
exposed to adverse currency rate movements). This involved
traders attempting to manipulate the relevant currency rate in the
market, for example, to ensure that the rate at which the bank had
agreed to sell a particular currency to its clients was higher than
the average rate it had bought that currency for in the market. If
successful, the bank would profit.201
This settlement was reached with a host of regulators including the
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in London, the CFTC, the OCC and
the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority. The settling banks
were Citigroup, JPMorgan, UBS, Royal Bank of Scotland, HSBC and Bank
of America. Citigroup and JPMorgan each paid about $1 billion in that
settlement.202 The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority also
201. Press Release, Financial Conduct Authority, FCA Fines Five Banks £1.1 Billion for
FX Failings and Announces Industry-Wide Remediation Program, (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-fines-five-banks-for-fx-failings
[https://perma.cc/5WU7RAA6].
202. Suzi Ring & Liam Vaughan, Citigroup, JP Morgan Pay Most in $4.3 Billion FX
Rig
Cases,
BLOOMBERG
BUS.
(Nov.
12,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-12/banks-to-pay-3-3-billion-in-fxmanipulation-probe [https://perma.cc/X7A8-ESR7]. The CFTC described the process for
fixing currency benchmarks as follows:
The WM/R Rates, one of the leading and most widely referenced FX
benchmark rates, are calculated multiple times daily, including at 4 p.m.
London time, which is commonly referred to as the “4 p.m. fix.” For twenty-one
of the most liquid currencies (the “trade currencies”), the 4 p.m. fix is based on
actual trades, using bids and offers extracted from a certain electronic trading
system during a one minute window (“fix period”). WM/Reuters determines the
bid and offer rates based on the captured transacted rate and the bid-offer
spread. WM/Reuters then calculates the median of these bid and offer rates and
from these medians determines a “mid trade rate.” If there are not enough
trades, WM/Reuters calculates a “mid order rate.” All orders and transactions
are weighted equally, regardless of their notional sizes.
The WM/R Rates for the other 139 less liquid currencies (the “non-trade
currencies”) are set by similar methodology. Because these currencies are less
liquid, WM/Reuters relies on indicative quotes (submissions) derived from a
Reuters computer feed that solicits “indications of interest” from market
participants as part of its fixing methodology.
WM/Reuters captures
independent snapshots of indicative quotes for bids and offers, and selects the
median rate from these quotes as the 4 p.m. WM/R fix.
WM/Reuters also provides fix rates for forward and non-deliverable forward
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required UBS to limit the compensation of its foreign exchange traders.
UBS was also required to automate at least nine percent of its foreign
currency exchange trading and to more effectively manage conflicts of
interest through the separation of customer and proprietary trading.203
Barclays dropped out of the settlement talks concerning its actions in
the foreign currency market. However, the bank set aside $1.8 billion to
cover potential fines from its foreign exchange trading and, as described
below, did later settle regulatory actions over its foreign exchange trading
activities.204
4. The JPMorgan et al. Second Settlement
The Justice Department conducted a separate investigation of the
foreign exchange operations of the usual suspects, i.e., the large banks. A
settlement of those claims was delayed because the Justice Department
demanded that the banks plead guilty to criminal charges.205 Settlements
with the Justice Department, and with other U.S. regulators, were
eventually reached in May 2015 that required the payment of $5.6 billion
by six large banks, viz, UBS AG, Barclays, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase,
Bank of America, and the Royal Bank of Scotland.206 All of these banks,
except Deutsche Bank, had been involved in the earlier $4.3 billion

contracts using methodology similar to that used for non-trade currencies. Fix
rates for forward and non-deliverable forward contracts are published using a
premium or discount to the spot rate for the relevant currency pair.
Other FX benchmark rates are also priced through the use of indicative rates.
For instance, the Russian Ruble/U.S. Dollar Emerging Markets Trade
Association (“EMTA”) benchmark rates are based on indicative rates submitted
by market participants to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”), which
takes the midpoint of submitted bid offer pairs that it randomly selects, discards
the highest and lowest midpoints, and calculates the final benchmark rate using
the mean of the remaining midpoints.
HSBC Bank plc, CFTC Docket No. 15-07 (2014).
203. Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, FINMA Sanctions Foreign
Exchange Manipulation at UBS, (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.finma.ch/e/aktuell/Pages/mmubs-devisenhandel-20141112.aspx [https://perma.cc/MJR4-Y7QX].
204. Barclays Reports Loss after Forex Probe Provision, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), (Mar. 3,
2015), http://on.ft.com/1NW8C6t [https://perma.cc/5RZT-B5MJ].
205. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Justice Department is Seeking Felony
Pleas by Big Banks in Foreign Currency Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 9, 2015),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/u-s-is-seeking-felony-pleas-by-big-banks-inforeign-currency-inquiry/ [https://perma.cc/3WQQ-JYNP].
206. Vogelli & Miller, supra note 201. See also Corkery & Protess, supra note 202
(discussing how the four large global banks plead guilty to federal crimes involving a
scheme to manipulate the world’s currencies).
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settlement described above.207
In the May 2015 settlement UBS AG agreed to pay $202 million to
the Justice Department and $342 million to the Federal Reserve Board.
UBS also agreed to plead guilty to one count of criminal fraud. The fine
and guilty pleas were based on a claim that UBS’ foreign exchange
activities breached a prior non-prosecution agreement that was entered into
as a part of the LIBOR settlement described above.208 Such agreements
allow a party to avoid criminal prosecution for a crime (e.g., the LIBOR
manipulation) on the condition that they engage in no other criminal
activity for some specified period of time. UBS also agreed to pay the
Connecticut Department of Banking for “unsafe . . . practices related to its
[foreign-exchange] market activity.”209
Barclays agreed with the Department of Justice to plead guilty to
criminal antitrust violations for its foreign exchange transgressions. It also
agreed to pay a total of $2.4 billion to settle claims brought by the CFTC,
the Federal Reserve Board, the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority and the
New York Department of Financial Services. The latter regulator also
required Barclays to fire eight employees.210 Barclays was additionally
found to have breached its LIBOR non-prosecution agreement through its
foreign exchange trading and was fined $60 million for that violation. In
November 2015, Barclays also settled claims brought by the State of New
York that it abused a so-called “last look” trading procedure on its
electronic currency exchange trading platform at the expense of customers.
“Last look” allowed the bank a small period of time to cancel a trade it
accepted after the fact where market conditions changed adversely. This
feature was intended to be a defense against HFTs, but was abused by
using it to cancel customer trades that were part of their regular marketmaking activities but which would have caused the bank a loss.211
JPMorgan Chase was required to pay a total of $892 million to the
Department of Justice and Federal Reserve Board in these second round

207. See VOGELLI & MILLER, supra note 201 and accompanying text (summarizing the
penalties paid by various large banks).
208. Antoine Gara, Swiss Bank UBS to Pay $342 Million Currency Manipulation Fine,
Plead
Guilty
on
LIBOR,
FORBES,
(May
20,
2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2015/05/20/swiss-bank-ubs-to-pay-342-millioncurrency-manipulation-fine-plead-guilty-on-libor/#1236d5d7f706 [https://perma.cc/DE8KU3UB]
209. Id.
210. Corkery & Protess, supra note 202.
211. Greg Farrell, Barclays Pays $150 Million to Settle New York Currency Probe,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 18,2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-1118/barclays-pays-150-million-to-settle-new-york-currency-probe [https://perma.cc/ZBN78ACR].
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settlements. Citigroup agreed to pay a total of $1.26 billion. The Royal
Bank of Scotland agreed to pay $669 million, and Bank of America agreed
to pay the Federal Reserve Board $205 million.212
The plea agreements with the Justice Department charged that the
defendant banks conspired to fix, stabilize, maintain, decrease or increase
the price of and rig bids and offers for the EUR/USD currency pairs by
eliminating competition. It was further alleged that this was done through
daily conversations in an electronic chat room, sometimes in code. This
chat room was called the “cartel” or the “Mafia,” and membership was
limited to employees of the co-conspirator banks.213 Through these
conservations the defendants coordinated:
the trading of the EUR/USD currency pair in connection with
European Central Bank and World Markets/Reuters benchmark
currency “fixes” which occurred at 2:15 PM (CET) and 4:00 PM
(GMT) each trading day; and (ii) refraining from certain trading
behavior, by withholding bids and offers, when one conspirator
held an open risk position, so that the price of the currency traded
would not move in a direction adverse to the conspirator with an
open risk position.214
5. The BONY Settlement
Separate actions were brought against the Bank of New York Mellon
(BONY) by the Justice Department, the Department of Labor, the SEC, the
New York attorney general (NYAG),215 and the Florida attorney general.216
The NYAG charged that BONY had promised certain foreign exchange
customers that they would receive the “best execution,” the “best rate of the
day,” and the “the most attractive/competitive rate available to the
Bank.”217 In fact, as alleged by the NYAG, BONY was executing those
orders at the worst rate traded during the trading date and kept the
212. Gina Chon, Caroline Binham & Laura Noonan, Six Banks Fined $5.6 Bn Over
Rigging of Foreign Exchange Markets, FIN. TIMES (LONDON) (May 20, 2015, 6:37 PM),
http://on.ft.com/1EjpSHB [https://perma.cc/4Q5S-XXTE].
213. Plea Agreement at 4(i), United States v. Barclays, PLC (2015).
214. Id. at 4(h).
215. BNY to Pay $714 Million to Settle Foreign Exchange Cases, FORTUNE, Mar. 19,
2015,
http://fortune.com/2015/03/19/bny-mellon-settlement-exchange/
[https://perma.cc/4VUC-KXNA].
216. News Release, Att’y Gen. Pam Bondi, Attorney General Pam Bondi Announces
$28 Million Settlement with Bank of New York Mellon (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/B342E613410013CA85257C160
065FCD8 [https://perma.cc/4SMU-WJEN].
217. People v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 114735/09, 40 Misc.3d 1232[A], 2013
NY slip op 51394[U].
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difference between that worst price and the price existing at the time of
execution. It was further alleged in the New York action that BONY made
some $2 billion from these transactions over the course of a decade.218
A New York Supreme Court judge held that these allegations were
sufficient to make out a case under the New York Martin Act against
BONY.219 The New York court in the BONY case considered whether the
New York Martin Act covered the foreign currency exchange transactions
at issue. As described above,220 the Martin Act was amended in 1925 to
extend its coverage to foreign currency orders.221 BONY contended that
this term did not apply to currency transactions executed pursuant to
standing instructions from customers that directed currency transactions to
be executed automatically without price negotiation. The court declined to
rule on that claim because it had an insufficient basis to decide the issue.
The court also found the legislative history of the Martin Act amendment
with respect to that term to be scant and its meaning unclear.
A federal court dismissed some charges brought by the Department of
Justice, but allowed a claim over whether BONY misrepresented that it was
providing best execution prices for foreign exchange to go forward.222 That
court also allowed similar claims in class actions brought by BONY
custodial clients over these practices to proceed.223 However, that decision
may not be consistent with an earlier opinion by the Fourth Circuit in
Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber.224 In Tauber, the court rejected a claim that
a dealer had made an oral agreement that a customer would receive the
“best price” because the defendant had touted its execution abilities. The
court noted that all trades had been confirmed in writing. Although the
confirmations did not include any “best pricing” clause, the plaintiff never
objected to the terms of the contracts.225
BONY settled these state and federal claims and related class actions
for $714 million in March 2015.226 However, this case did not end the

218. Id. at 2.
219. Id. at 13.
220. See, supra note 93 (describing how the Martin Act was amended to cover foreign
currency orders and options).
221. N.Y Gen. Bus. Law § 352(1) (McKinney 2015).
222. U.S. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
223. See, e.g., In re Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. Forex Transactions Litig., 921 F.
Supp.2d 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying bank’s motion to dismiss transportation authority’s
claims alleging the bank’s failure to provide best execution price for funds’ exchange
transaction).
224. Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S.
1031 (1994).
225. Id. at 979.
226. BNY to Pay $714 Million to Settle Foreign Exchange Cases, supra note 215.
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foreign exchange investigations of the large banks by New York. The New
York Department of Financial Services, an agency separate from the
NYAG, was conducting an investigation of the electronic trading platforms
created by the large banks for trading foreign exchange. That agency was
apparently concerned that the banks were manipulating prices or engaging
in abusive trading practices on those platforms.227 The New York attorney
general also launched an investigation to determine whether several large
traders were “spoofing” trades in the foreign exchange market. Spoofing
involves the entry of orders a trader intends to cancel before execution in
order to mislead other traders on market conditions.228
6. State Street Bank Action
The state of California sued State Street Bank, claiming that the state’s
two giant public employee pension funds had been defrauded by foreign
exchange overcharges.229 State Street paid $60 million to settle a class
action suit over that issue that was brought in Massachusetts, and it
remained under investigation by the SEC.230
7. Bank of England Scandal
Improper sharing and aggregation of institutional customer orders for
foreign exchange caused a scandal at the Bank of England in 2014, which
was made aware of such practices as early as 2006. The Bank suspended
one of its employees in March 2014 in connection with an investigation of
that trading. That suspension was followed by others at BNP Paribas and
Bank of America who were sharing customer information. Some twodozen foreign exchange traders were suspended or fired as a result of this

227. Gina Chon & Ben McLannahan, NY Regulator Raises Spectre of Further Forex
Penalties
for
Banks,
FIN.
TIMES
(LONDON),
May
22,
2015,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/092572d2-0005-11e5-abd500144feabdc0.html#axzz47RavEjHo [https://perma.cc/GF3S-SJX5].
228. Liz Moyer, New York Opens Inquiry Into Electronic Trade ‘Spoofing,’ N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/business/dealbook/new-york-opensinquiry-into-electronic-trade-spoofing.html?WT.mc_id=SmartBriefsNewsletter&WT.mc_ev=click&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6YWR-6XUU].
229. Press Release, Att’y Gen. Kamala D. Harris, Brown Sues State Street Bank for
Massive
Fraud
Against
CalPERS
and
CalSTRS
(Oct.
20,
2009),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/brown-sues-state-street-bank-massive-fraud-againstcalpers-and-calstrs [https://perma.cc/7X45-VLEN].
230. Andrew Harris, State Street Agrees to Settle Forex Fee Suit for $60 Mln,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, July 9, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0709/state-street-agrees-to-settle-forex-fee-case-for-60-mln [https://perma.cc/HR6E-AYQQ].
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inquiry.231
A subsequent investigation concluded that the Bank of England’s
chief foreign exchange dealer was aware that traders were sharing
aggregated information about customer orders in order to match those
orders with others. Such matching was itself not improper but presented
the opportunity for collusive conduct.232 Another report asserted that a
Bank of England official was included on emails of traders discussing the
manipulation of the currency prices.233
8. Class Actions
The press reported that foreign exchange traders among several large
banks and a large energy firm were using chat rooms to exchange
information that allowed them to manipulate the market and take advantage
of customer orders.234 Several class actions were brought over this activity.
A district court denied a motion to dismiss consolidated class actions
challenging the foreign currency trading practices under the Sherman
Antitrust Act.235
The complaint in this case charged that the defendants had conspired
to manipulate the daily Fix rate.236 That manipulation was alleged to have
occurred through concerted trading strategies that were formulated in “chat
rooms, with evocative names such as ‘The Cartel,’ ‘The Bandits’ Club,’
231. Bank,
Fix
Thyself,
THE
ECONOMIST,
Mar.
8,
2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21598678-bank-england-facesquestions-over-its-role-rigged-forex-deals-bank-fix [https://perma.cc/N3MM-WEZ6].
232. Lord Grabiner QC, Bank of England Foreign Exchange Market Investigation,
Report, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2014/grabiner.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KB46-KPTV] (last visited May 5, 2015).
233. David Enrich, Bank of England Official Received Emails Relating to Libor
Manipulation, Prosecutor Says, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2015, http://on.wsj.com/1V3AGns
[https://perma.cc/8NXU-CUSW].
234. Liam Vaughan, Cartel: How BP Used a Secret Chat Room for Insider Tips,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, Dec. 29, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-1230/cartel-chat-room-tied-to-bp-gave-fx-tips-from-banks-to-client [https://perma.cc/3E7ND9CL].
235. 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2.
236. In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
The daily “fixing” of rates sets a benchmark for pricing currencies:
Institutions find it useful to take a snapshot of how much is being bought and
sold. This happens every day in the 30 seconds before and after 16:00 in
London and the result is known as the 4pm fix, or just the fix. The fix is very
important, as it is the peg on which many other financial markets depend.
Sebastian Chrispin, Forex Scandal: How to Rig a Market, BBC (May 20, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26526905 [https://perma.cc/5ULZ-9H3C].

ARTICLE 4 (MARKHAM) (DO NOT DELETE)

828

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

5/22/16 9:11 PM

[Vol. 18:3

The ‘Mafia’ and ‘One Team, One Dream’ . . . .”237 Through those chat
rooms, the defendants’ foreign exchange traders were alleged to have
shared market-sensitive information, including “information about
pricing,” their customers’ orders and their net trading positions in advance
of 4 p.m. London time.
Using this nonpublic information, the defendants were alleged to have
set the Fix at an artificial level by “banging the close” through trades
broken up into small orders that would have a greater cumulative effect on
the Fix and by “painting the screen” through fake orders. 238 The
defendants were also charged with “front running” customer orders.239
Three of the defendant banks settled these actions. UBS AG paid $135
million in that settlement; JPMorgan Chase & Co. paid $99.5 million.240
Bank of America agreed to pay an additional $180 million.241 More
settlements followed, and by August 2015, the total agreed to be paid in
these class action lawsuits exceeded $2 billion. The additional settling
banks included Goldman Sachs, HSBC Holdings Plc, Barclays, Plc, and
BNP Paribas, SA; more settlements were expected from seven other large
banks that were also named as defendants in that litigation.242
9. Regulatory Response
The U.S. Justice Department was reported to have expanded its
investigations into foreign currency manipulations in 2015 to include the
Russian ruble and Brazilian real and was considering actions against
individual traders.243 Bank regulators were also seeking enhancements in
the regulation of the interbank exchange market after the price

237. In re Foreign Exch., 74 F. Supp. 3d at 587.
238. Id. at 594.
239. Id. Front running involves a broker trading for its own account with knowledge that
a customer will be trading at a price that will allow the broker to profit from its prior trade.
See Jerry W. Markham, “Front-Running”— Insider Trading Under the Commodity
Exchange Act, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 69 (1988) (describing front running concerns).
240. Eric Larson & Phil Milford, BofA Investors Say Settlement Reached in Forex Class
Action,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS,
Apr.
16,
2015,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-16/bofa-investors-say-settlementreached-in-forex-class-action [https://perma.cc/U884-CFHT].
241. Christina Rexrode, Bank of America to Pay $180 Million to Settle Investors’ Forex
Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/bank-of-america-to-pay180-million-to-settle-private-forex-lawsuit-1430340190 [https://perma.cc/EB3C-RRY2].
242. Nate Raymond, Currency-Rigging Lawsuit Settlements Rise Past $2 Billion:
Lawyer, REUTERS, Aug. 13, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/13/us-forexmanipulation-settlement-idUSKCN0QI2J720150813 [https://perma.cc/L76K-AXYW].
243. Tom Schoenberg & Silla Brush, U.S. Currency Probe Said to Expand to Russia,
Brazil, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1748 (Aug. 31, 2015).
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manipulation scandals emerged. The U.K. required the setting of eight
benchmarks, including Libor and precious metals, to be administered by
independent administrators that the FCA would regulate like public
utilities.244 This plan, however had a few obvious flaws, i.e., who will
assure that the independent administrator’s exchange rate setting is fair and
is not itself manipulated, as was the case with the California electricity
market at the turn of the century.245
The FCA also announced that it was implementing a “remediation”
program that would require firms operating in the interbank foreign
exchange market to review their supervisory controls to assure they were
sufficient to manage their foreign exchange risks. Managers at those firms
were also required to attest that their controls were adequate.246 Despite
these efforts, the FCA was complaining some five years after the disclosure
of the Libor manipulations that the rate setting mechanism for that
benchmark was still broken.247
The Bank of England considered whether to require that foreign
exchange transactions be time-stamped to show when they were executed.
This would allow a customer to determine if they received a fair price
based on the market at the time of the time stamp.248 A global code of
conduct was also being considered by central banks that would, among
other things, provide guidance on what constitutes confidential customer
information and what information may be disclosed to other traders,
particularly information concerning orders submitted for execution in the
daily benchmark fixing sessions.249 This effort was being led by the Bank
for International Settlements.250
244. Huw Jones, UK Watchdog Proposes New Rules to Avoid Excessive Fees for
Benchmarks, REUTERS, June 3, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/03/britainregulations-markets-idAFL5N0YP27820150603 [https://perma.cc/6YSF-54MT].
245. See Jerry W. Markham & Lawrence Hunt Jr., The California Energy Crisis—
Enron’s Gaming of Governor Gray’s Imperfect Market, 24 Fut. & Derv. L. Rep. 1 (2004)
(describing those manipulations).
246. FCA, supra note 203.
247. Juliet Samuel and Chiara Albanese, No Fix for Libor: Benchmark Still Broken,
Regulators Say, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/libor-reform-hasnot-gone-far-enough-says-regulator-1436195584 [https://perma.cc/VL4L-C4K2].
248. Sheryl Gesto Obejera, Report: UK Treasury Wants BoE to Consider Time Stamps
for Forex Trades, SNL, Apr. 6, 2015, http://www.smartbrief.com/04/07/15/boe-reportedlyfaces-pressure-weigh-fx-time-stamp#.VSaM51w-BBw [https://perma.cc/4VKF-P7SY].
249. Patrick Graham, Exclusive: Central Banks Agree New Rules for FX Market
Conduct, REUTERS, Mar. 23, 2015, http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/03/23/us-fxinvestigation-idINKBN0MJ1NI20150323 [https://perma.cc/P8CP-7C8P].
250. Patrick Graham, 2-BIS Sets Sights on Single Global FX Code of Conduct, REUTERS,
May
11,
2015,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/11/forex-codesidUKL5N0Y22QS20150511 [https://perma.cc/Z29H-VZTB].
The Financial Stability
Board, which coordinates international banking regulation, reported in October 2015 that
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THE RETAIL OTC FOREIGN EXCHANGE CASH MARKET

The dissolution of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime led
to the vast expansion of the commercial interbank foreign exchange
market. It also led to the rapid growth of a retail market for foreign
exchange for international travelers. Those retail dealers in foreign
currencies were often found in kiosks in airports and on the streets of
popular tourist destinations.
Bank branches also provided foreign
exchange services.251 In making exchange transactions, travelers are
required to exchange at the dealer’s quoted bid or ask price, a difference
that is called a “spread.” This spread is the dealer’s profit in foreign
exchange transactions. Consequently, there will nearly always be a
difference between the quoted bids and offers, the bid being lower than the
offer.252
To illustrate, someone traveling to London changing dollars into
pounds would pay a retail dealer rate at the quoted ask price from the
branch office of a bank or currency kiosk on the street. When returning to
the United States, that traveler would, assuming the dealer’s spread has not
changed, exchange any remaining pounds for dollars at a rate lower than
she received when selling those same dollars. This is the spread through
which these moneychangers profit. That traveler may also be charged an
additional service fee or commissions by dealers, thereby further increasing
the cost of the currency conversion. All things being equal, the dealer will
profit on the difference in the spreads. In fact, all things might not be
equal, as when the dealer has an imbalance of currency in inventory that
declines. The dealer will be constantly adjusting its spread prices to reflect
changes in the relative value of the currencies in which it deals.253
In contrast to the dealer, a speculator will try to profit from changes in
the relative value of one currency versus another. For example, a
speculator might exchange pounds for dollars at today’s rate in hopes that
those pounds will increase in value and can be resold for dollars at an
increased amount of dollars. In order to profit, however, the pound will
have to increase enough to offset the dealer’s spread and any commissions
progress had been made on London fixings but that more was needed. Chiara Albanese,
Currencies Trading Needs Further Cleanup, Regulators Say, WALL ST. J. (N.Y.), Oct. 1,
2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/currencies-trading-needs-further-cleanup-regulators-say1443699941 [https://perma.cc/8BAP-9PU3].
251. See Foreign Exchange Markets and Technology, CLOANTO, July 7, 2012,
http://currencysystem.com/kb/13-138 (describing the retail tier of the foreign exchange
market) [https://perma.cc/3A5H-ZF8G].
252. See What is Forex, FXCM, https://www.fxcm.com/forex/what-is-forex/
[https://perma.cc/3KM2-E8UB] (last visited May 13, 2015) (describing the dealer’s spread).
253. See id. (describing how speculators profit).
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or fees.
Historically, most foreign exchange dealers required retail customers
to pay a much broader so-called “spread” than was available to commercial
parties in the interbank foreign exchange market.
However, the
introduction of electronic trading platforms at the end of the last century
resulted in more competition and narrower spreads in both the retail and
commercial markets. “While in the 1980s the bid-ask spreads in the overthe-counter market were roughly 20 times those in the inter-dealer market,
they have since compressed and are roughly equal.”254 Still, travelers using
a bureau de change to convert their currencies will be charged a wider
spread than available to direct bank customers and/or a commission.255
Retail cash foreign currency transactions using credit or debit cards
also pay a dealer’s spread and are subject to conversion fees charged by the
banks issuing the cards. This means that the retail credit or credit card
customer receives two hits when converting, because the banks generally
use a currency exchange rate less favorable than that available in the
commercial interbank market, to which is added the conversion fee. Those
charges have been the subject of extended litigation.
A class action lawsuit brought under the Sherman Antitrust Act256
sought damages on behalf of holders of credit cards from Visa,
MasterCard, and Diners Club who were charged currency conversion fees
between February 1, 1996 and November 8, 2006.257 The plaintiffs claimed
that those defendants and their banks conspired to set and conceal currency
conversion fees that generally ranged from one to three percent of foreign
transactions even when the banks were not exchanging any currency. As a
district court described this claim:
[P]laintiffs allege that the procedure VISA and MasterCard use to
process all foreign currency transactions, sometimes referred to
as ‘netting out,’ often leads to the bulk of foreign currency
transactions being conducted without an actual purchase or sale
of any foreign currency. Plaintiffs offer the following example:
‘if 100 U.S. VISA cardholders in France charge U.S. $10,000 in
French francs in goods on March 26, 2001, and 100 French VISA
cardholders in the U.S. spend the equivalent of U.S. $10,000 on
the same day, defendant VISA does not actually convert any
254. Sterk v. Bank of America Corp., No. 15 CV 2705 Class Action Complaint at ¶¶7879 (S.D.N.Y. April 7, 2015).
255. See Exchange Rates, LONDONFX, http://www.londonfx.co.uk/exchrate.html
[https://perma.cc/C433-8QVR] (last visited May 13, 2015) (describing these differences in
spreads and fees).
256. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
257. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, 265 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
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currency.’ VISA and MasterCard automatically impose this
currency conversion fee on the cardholder at the network level.
There are two tranches of currency conversion fees charged by
VISA and MasterCard. The first, which plaintiffs label the ‘first
tier’ fee, is charged by VISA and MasterCard at an identical 1%
of the purchase price. This 1% first tier fee is paid by the
cardholder and retained by the respective associations. The
‘second tier’ fee is ‘typically’ two percent (2%), and is often
charged on top of the 1% first tier fee. This 2% second tier fee is
automatically charged by the network, paid by the cardholder,
and retained by the cardholder’s issuing bank.258
The complaint further charged that Visa and MasterCard inflated their
exchange rates before applying their currency conversion fees.259 The
defendants contended that these claims were subject to arbitration and
sought dismissal of the class action claims. The district court required a
trial on that issue and that order was affirmed on appeal.260 The plaintiffs
claimed damages of some $3.8 billion,261 but the case was subsequently
settled for about $50 million.262
Credit card charges for cross-border transactions continued to be of
concern. MasterCard capped its currency exchange fees in 2009 after it
was advised by the European Commission’s competition authority that its
fees were too high. In 2015, that same regulator charged MasterCard with
charging excessive fees for transactions between countries in the European
Union (EU) and for transactions on cards outside the EU.263
IV.

EXCHANGE TRADED FOREIGN EXCHANGE FUTURES

A. Background
Commodity futures contracts on agricultural products have been

258. Id. at 393-394.
259. Id. at 396.
260. Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2007).
261. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation (MDL 1409),
https://www.ccfsettlement.com/faqs/#idQ15 [https://perma.cc/P2RA-PFZ3].
262. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation (MDL 1409),
http://www.ccfsettlement.com/documents/Ross%20v%20Amex%20Preliminary%20Approv
al%20Motion%20-%20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/P76D-D4LN]
263. European Antitrust Regulator Accuses MasterCard of Excessive Card Fees,
REUTERS (July 9, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/09/eu-antitrust-mastercardidUSL8N0ZP20T20150709
[http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/09/eu-antitrustmastercard-idUSL8N0ZP20T20150709]
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traded on exchanges since the Civil War.264 Coincidentally, the breakdown
of the Bretton Woods agreement occurred at a time when the futures
industry was experimenting with the introduction of derivative instruments
that were based on price changes in financial instruments. One such
initiative involved the development of a futures market in foreign exchange
called the International Monetary Market (IMM). That exchange was
boosted by the Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman who
supported the creation of such an exchange after his bank refused to allow
him to take a short position in the British pound in anticipation of a
devaluation of that currency.265 Traders on the IMM also engaged in
foreign exchange transactions in the commercial interbank market. Those
traders accounted for about 15 percent of volume in the interbank market
by 1980.266
B. The CFTC’s Jurisdiction
Attending these developments was the enactment of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 (CFTC Act).267 That legislation
amended the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA). Among other
things, the CFTC Act created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC). The CFTC replaced the Commodity Exchange Authority, a small
bureau in the Department of Agriculture, as the regulator responsible for
enforcing the CEA.268 This new agency was thought necessary because the
resources of the Commodity Exchange Authority proved inadequate to deal
with heavy trading volumes and the expansion of futures trading on
financial and other products that occurred during the inflationary period
that began in the 1960s.269
The CEA initially applied only to futures contracts on a limited
number of agricultural commodities. Several amendments to the CEA over
264. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS
REGULATION 2 (1987) (describing the nature and history of commodity futures trading).
265. See MELAMED, supra note 137, at 170-177 (describing the development of the
International Monetary Market).
266. JULIAN, WAMSLEY, THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE HANDBOOK 15 (1983).
267. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88
Stat. 1389 (1974).
268. Under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 as it then existed, the Department of
Agriculture had day-to-day oversight responsibility for futures trading, which duties were
fulfilled by the Commodity Exchange Authority. However, the Commodity Exchange
Commission set policy for futures trading under that Act. That commission was composed
of the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce and the Attorney General. MARKHAM, supra
note 264, at 27.
269. Id. at 55-65. The CFTC is a five member independent federal agency similar to the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
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the years expanded its reach to other agricultural products on which futures
trading had expanded to include. Congress, however, was unable to keep
pace with the rapid expansion of futures trading to additional commodities,
including non-agricultural commodities, such as gold and silver. The
CFTC Act changed the approach of regulation from regulating only certain
enumerated commodities to a broader approach of regulating all exchange
traded commodity futures, whatever the commodity. The CFTC was given
exclusive jurisdiction over all such exchange traded commodity futures and
options contracts.270
The CEA requires all futures contracts, with limited exceptions, to be
traded on a board of trade that is registered with the CFTC as a “designated
contract market” (DCM). One exception to this requirement, the so-called
“Treasury Amendment,” that was included in the CFTC Act in order to
exclude the commercial interbank foreign exchange market from the
CFTC’s jurisdiction. A Senate Report on the CFTC Act noted that: “[a]
great deal of the trading in foreign currency in the United States is carried
out through an informal network of banks and tellers.”271 The report
concluded “this market is more properly supervised by the bank regulatory
agencies and that, therefore, regulation under this legislation is
unnecessary.”272
The Treasury Amendment stated that the CFTC would have no
jurisdiction to regulate “transactions in foreign currency . . . unless such
transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a
board of trade.”273 As described below, this meant that, unlike other
commodities, futures and options on foreign exchange could be traded in
the OTC market. As also described below, such OTC trading was beyond
the reach of the CFTC until additional legislation was added to allocate
jurisdiction among the CFTC, bank regulators and the SEC.
C. Regulated Futures Contracts on Foreign Currency
DCMs are required to use a clearinghouse that is registered with the
CFTC as a “derivatives clearing organization” (DCO). These DCOs are
required to clear and guarantee the performance of futures and options
contracts trade on DCMs. The DCOs are required to meet certain core
principles such as assuring the sufficiency of their settlement procedures,
risk management, system safeguards and default procedures.274
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 67.
S. Rep. No. 93-1131 (1974).
Id.
7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
See Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Commodity Futures and Exchange Traded
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DCMs are required to police their members to ensure that they comply
with the exchange’s rules. There are also broad reaching registration and
regulatory requirements for industry participants. Those registrants include
futures commission merchants (FCMs).275 FCMs act as brokers for
customer orders and accept customer funds in connection with those orders.
FCMs are subject to a number of regulatory requirements under the CEA.
They include financial reporting requirements,276 a minimum net capital
requirement,277 a requirement that customer funds be kept segregated278 and
extensive recordkeeping requirements.279 Risk disclosure statements must
also be given to customers.
These protections do not assure that customers will not lose money in
trading exchange regulated foreign currency transactions. In one case, the
Second Circuit found that an individual trader lost $215 million from
trading on foreign currency futures over the course of less than five months
in 1994-1995.280 The Court ruled in that case that the trader’s FCM owed
him no fiduciary duty to provide advice and warnings of the dangers of
such trades. This was because the trader was wealthy and sophisticated and
was aware from experience of the dangers of such trading.281
D. Anti-Manipulation Authority
The CEA prohibits manipulation282 and certain disruptive trading
Options, Bloomberg/BNA, Securities Practice Portfolio Series, II. (2015) (describing the
role and regulation of DCOs).
275. 7 U.S.C. § 6d.
276. 17 C.F.R. § 1.10.
277. 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.12, 1.17.
278. 17 C.F.R. § 1.20.
279. 17 C.F.R. §1.31.
280. As the Court noted:
In a period of less than five months in 1994-95, plaintiff Henryk de
Kwiatkowski (“Kwiatkowski”) made and lost hundreds of millions of dollars
betting on the U.S. dollar by trading in currency futures. Kwiatkowski traded on
a governmental scale: At one point, his positions accounted for 30 percent of the
total open interest in certain currencies on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
After netting over $200 million in the first trading weeks, Kwiatkowski’s
fortunes turned; between late December 1994 and mid-January 1995,
Kwiatkowski suffered single-day losses of $112 million, $98 million, and $70
million. He continued losing money through the winter. Having lost tens of
millions over the preceding several days, Kwiatkowski liquidated all his
positions starting on Sunday, March 5 and finishing the next day. In all,
Kwiatkowski had suffered net losses of $215 million.
De Kwiatowski v. Bear Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 2002).
281. Id. at 1308-1309.
282. 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 13(a)(2).
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practices, such as wash sales.283 The anti-manipulation prohibitions
contained in the CEA, when it was enacted in 1936, were at the very heart
of the effort by Congress to regulate the commodity futures markets.
However, the CEA failed to define what it meant by manipulation. It was
therefore left to the government and the courts to define the term.284 They
came up with a four-part test that requires the following elements to be
proved in order to establish an actual commodity price manipulation:
1. the trader had the ability to influence market prices;
2. the trader specifically intended to create an artificial price;
3. an artificial price occurred; and
4. the trader caused the artificial price.285
In an attempted manipulation case, the CFTC has asserted that it need only
prove specific intent through some overt act that was intended to be
manipulative.286 The elements of manipulation and attempted manipulation
are very difficult to prove, especially the specific intent requirement.287
Indeed, while obtaining numerous settlements, the CFTC has won only one
adjudicated manipulation case in its forty-year history.288
To ease the burden of proving manipulative intent the Dodd-Frank Act
in 2010 amended the CEA to add language borrowed from Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“34 Act”), which prohibits any
“manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.”289 It was thought that
this language would ease the burden of proving manipulative intent
because the courts had interpreted it to require only a showing of
recklessness.290 However, this is still a very high standard of intent and the

283. 7 U.S.C. § 6c.
284. See Jerry W. Markham, The Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The
Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281 (l99l) (describing the background for this
legislation and the effects of a lack of definition).
285. Frey v. CFTC, 931 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir. 1991).
286. In the Matter of Hohenberg Bros., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶20, 271, n. 41
(C.F.T.C. 1977).
287. JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL MARKET
MANIPULATION (2014) (describing the difficulty of proving manipulation charges).
288. In the Matter of Diplacido, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. ¶30,970 (C.F.T.C. 2008), aff’d sub
nom., DiPlacido v. CFTC, No. 08-5559-ag, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 22692 (2d Cir. 2009),
cert denied, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 2461 (2010).
289. 15 U.S.C. §78j(b).
290. See, e.g., South Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Group LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 109-110
(2d Cir. 2009) (noting that the Second Circuit has long held that reckless disregard for the
truth satisfies the scienter element of a securities fraud action); Robert N. Clemens Trust v.
Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 485 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that the Sixth Circuit
has long held reckless behavior satisfies the scienter element of a securities fraud action);
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F. 2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (interpreting the scienter element of a securities fraud action as
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difference between that standard and the specific intent required under the
pre-Dodd-Frank anti-manipulation authority may be only slight.291
A class action lawsuit was filed in the wake of the interbank foreign
exchange market scandals that are described above. That follow-on suit
charged that the twelve large banks involved in the London Fix
manipulations were also manipulating regulated foreign exchange futures
contracts that were traded on two regulated DCMs.292 The complaint
charged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and violations of the antimanipulation provisions of the CEA and CFTC rules.293 That litigation was
pending as of the date of this writing.
E. Exchange Traded Foreign Exchange Options
The CFTC allowed the trading of foreign currency options on
regulated DCMs, but the SEC challenged the CFTC’s otherwise broad
exclusive jurisdiction over exchange-traded derivatives with respect to the
trading of options on foreign currencies. In 1973, the creation of the
Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (CBOE) laid the groundwork for
that regulatory competition. Created by a futures exchange, the CBOE
traded options on stock in a manner used by the commodity futures
exchanges.294 The SEC assumed jurisdiction over that exchange because
options on stock had been traditionally within its jurisdiction. The creation
of the CBOE also predated the CFTC Act of 1974, and at that time the
CEA did not then cover futures or options on financial instruments.
As the Seventh Circuit noted in resolving a jurisdictional dispute
between the SEC and the futures exchange that created the CBOE:
The CBOE itself, the nation’s first central market for securities
options, evolved from an effort by the Chicago Board of Trade in
the late 1960’s to develop futures contracts in securities. At that
time, however, such activity did not fall within the Commodity
Exchange Act, the statute governing other Chicago Board of
Trade activity. As a result, the plan was modified to qualify it as

a recklessness standard).
291. See MARKHAM, supra note 287 at § 8:2 (describing further why the two standards
may vary only slightly).
292. Robert Mackenzie Smith, CME Forex Fix Questioned in New Lawsuit, RISK.NET
(May 8, 2015), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/news/2407756/cme-forex-fix-questionedin-new-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/3GYR-R7EA].
293. Sterk v. Bank of America Corp., No. 15 CV 2705 Class Action Complaint
(S.D.N.Y. April 7, 2015).
294. See generally Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Stock and Commodity
Options—Two Regulatory Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALBANY L. REV. 741 (1983)
(detailing the creation of the CBOE).
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an options program under the Federal securities laws. Had the
plan emerged after the 1974 amendments to the Commodity
Exchange Act, when the term “commodity” was broadened to
encompass securities and the CFTC was awarded exclusive
regulatory jurisdiction, the Chicago Board of Trade could have
retained its original objective of trading securities futures
contracts on its own floor under the same statute-the Commodity
Exchange Act-governing its other activities. The divergence of
securities options trading from futures trading was fortuitous,
therefore, due to a state of the law at the time that no longer
applies.295
The SEC began squabbling over the scope of the CFTC’s exclusive
jurisdiction over options and futures on financial instruments soon after the
creation of the CFTC. The SEC was unsuccessful in curbing the CFTC’s
regulation of derivative financial instruments. The respective chairmen of
the two agencies then reached an agreement delineating their respective
roles.296 That agreement was included in the Futures Trading Act of
1982.297 Among other things, that legislation gave the SEC jurisdiction
over trading in foreign exchange on national securities exchanges
registered with that agency. The CFTC retained exclusive jurisdiction over
options and futures on foreign exchange conducted on contract markets
regulated by the CFTC.298 Trading in options on several foreign currencies
was undertaken by various exchanges, and Nasdaq continues to trade
options on currencies.299
V.

THE RETAIL OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET

A. SEC and CFTC Jurisdiction
Another provision in the CFTC Act gave the CFTC exclusive
jurisdiction over most commodity options. Previously, the CEA had,
because of abuses, prohibited options trading on the agriculture
commodities regulated by that statute.300 Nevertheless, trading in options

295. Board of Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1140, n. 2 (7th Cir. 1982).
296. See Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC—A Clash of Cultures, 78 U.
CIN. L. REV. 537, 569-571 (2009) (describing the turf wars between the agencies).
297. Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1982).
298. See Jerry W. Markham, Super-Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities
and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, Great Britain & Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 319, 360, n. 210 (2003) (describing this jurisdictional division).
299. Nasdaq Spot FX Options, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/forex/spot-fxoptions.aspx [https://perma.cc/6BNK-TVNB] (last visited May 13, 2015).
300. 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1936).
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on unregulated commodities had become popular in the 1970s. That
trading was fueled by inflation that encouraged speculation through options
trading on precious metals and in foreign exchange after the breakdown of
the Bretton Woods agreement. A number of scandals arose in the sale of
those options to the public just before the creation of the CFTC. The SEC
stepped in and charged that those options were securities regulated under
the federal securities laws.301
The SEC’s action stopped much of this fraud, but the CFTC Act
removed jurisdiction from the SEC over commodity options and granted
the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over those instruments.302 That was not, at
least initially, a good choice because the CFTC had no regulations in place
to govern such trading and little staff to administer such regulations. The
result was a resurgence of fraud by firms marketing OTC commodity
options. The CFTC then tried to adopt regulations to strictly regulate OTC
commodity option sales, but that action came too late to stop the
widespread fraudulent sale of these instruments.303 In one famous case it
was discovered that an escaped felon ran one of the largest fraudulent
operations.304 The CFTC then acted to suspend all retail commodity option
sales in 1978, but later allowed exchange traded options that could be
closely regulated.305
B. CFTC Jurisdiction
The CFTC’s actions did not stop fraud in OTC foreign exchange
instruments. Those OTC dealers simply styled their instruments as cash or
forward contracts that were outside the CFTC’s jurisdiction. The CFTC
responded with actions charging that these were actually disguised futures
or options that had to be traded on a regulated exchange. The CFTC was
successful in several actions involving OTC transactions in bullion and
other commodities, but frauds continued to proliferate.306 Disaster struck in
1983, after J. David & Co. was discovered to be running a foreign
exchange Ponzi scheme in San Diego that took in some $200 million from
301. See Jerry W. Markham, “Confederate Bonds,” “General Custer,” and the
Regulation of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 17, n. 61 (1994)
(describing those events).
302. 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1970) (amended 1974).
303. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 296, at 763-66 (describing these regulations
and events).
304. See Markham, supra note 116, at 54-55 (describing that scandal).
305. Exempted from that ban were commercial or trade options that did not involve the
public. Markham & Gilberg, supra note 296, at 766-68.
306. See, e.g., CFTC v. Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1982)
(prosecuting OTC bullion dealer for selling illegal OTC futures).
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many prominent individuals in that city. The owner of the firm, J. David
Dominelli, a.k.a. “Captain Money,” promised investors returns of 40
percent from foreign currency trades that were supposedly made in the
interbank foreign exchange market that was outside the jurisdiction of the
CFTC.307 Dominelli received a twenty-year prison sentence, but was
released after ten.308
The CFTC tried to close the Treasury Amendment loophole in 1985
through a proposed interpretation of that provision that would exclude from
its reach foreign exchange transactions involving members of the public.
The CFTC proposal asserted that the Treasury Amendment applied only to
banks and large commercial institutions.309 That proposal encountered a
storm of criticism when it was published for comment, and it was tabled.310
Nevertheless, the CFTC continued to claim in its enforcement cases that
the Treasury Amendment did not apply to foreign exchange transactions in
futures or options traded in the OTC market. That assertion resulted in a
split among the courts that the Supreme Court was called upon to resolve.
The Fourth Circuit held in Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber311 that
futures and options on foreign exchange were excluded from the CFTC’s
jurisdiction by the Treasury Amendment. The Court noted that:
Interpretations of the Treasury Amendment have varied with the
role of the interpreter. The Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, pressing for greater regulation of transactions in
foreign currencies, contends that the Treasury Amendment’s
exemption is intended to be narrowly tailored to exclude only
spot and cash forward transactions, leaving all other futures and
options to be regulated by the broad inclusive regulatory
language of the Act. Foreign currency traders and the United
States contend that off-exchange trades must not be burdened by
regulation, and the plain meaning of the Treasury Amendment
expressly so provides.312
The Court concluded, however that “the appropriate interpretation of the

307. See DONALD BAUDER, CAPTAIN MONEY AND THE GOLDEN GIRL: THE J. DAVID
AFFAIR (1985) (describing this Ponzi scheme).
308. Nate
Rawlings,
Top
10
Swindlers,
TIME,
Mar.
7,
2012,
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2104982_2104983_2105003,
00.html [https://perma.cc/CU4B-3RWU].
309. CFTC, Trading in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983
(Oct. 23, 1985).
310. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments Under the Commodity
Exchange Act: A Call for Alternatives, 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. REV 1, 9-10 (l990) (describing
this controversy).
311. 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993).
312. Id. at 974-975.
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Treasury Amendment, all off-exchange transactions in foreign currency,
including futures and options, are exempted from regulation by the
CEA.”313
The Second Circuit took the opposite approach and agreed with the
CFTC’s position that such instruments were outside the reach of the
Treasury Amendment.314 The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in
that case in order to resolve the circuit split.315 The Supreme Court held in
Dunn v. CFTC316 that the Treasury Amendment excluded the CFTC from
regulating off exchange trading in options to buy foreign currency. That
ruling served to encourage the continuation of widespread fraud in retail
OTC futures and options on currencies.317
C. The CFMA
After its defeat in the Dunn case, the CFTC sought legislation from
Congress that would allow it to regulate dealers selling retail foreign
exchange futures or options. Congress included such authority in the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA).318
That
legislation amended the CEA to prohibit the sale of retail OTC futures or
options contracts unless the party offering the transaction was a financial
institution, a broker-dealer registered with the SEC, a futures commission
merchant (FCM) registered with the CFTC, an insurance company or its
affiliates, a regulated financial holding company or an investment bank
holding company.319
The theory behind this legislation was to eliminate the unregulated,
fly-by-night, fraudulent operations marketing OTC foreign exchange

313. Id. at 976.
314. CFTC v. Dunn, 58 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1995).
315. Dunn v. CFTC, 517 U.S. 1219 (1996).
316. 519 U.S. 465 (1997).
317. For example, in New York Currency Research Corp. v. CFTC, 180 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.
1999), the respondent terminated its registration as a commodity trading advisor and
commodity pool operator with the CFTC after the Supreme Court’s decision in Dunn. The
respondent then refused to respond to CFTC requests for information about its currency
trading operations. The Second Circuit held that the respondent did not need to comply with
the information requests because it was exempt from CFTC regulation.
318. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, § 102 (2000).
319. 7 U.S.C. §2(c)(2)(B) (2000). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 amended this list by removing insurance companies and financial
and investment bank holding companies from the approved providers. In addition, DoddFrank required financial institutions offering these products to be U.S. based. See Jerry W.
Markham, Regulation of Swap and Other Over-The-Counter Derivative Contracts,
Bloomberg/BNA Securities Practice Portfolio Series No. 263, at p. A-50 (2014) (describing
effects of the Dodd-Frank legislation).
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futures and options. In their stead, only highly regulated entities with
substantial capital were allowed to sell those products. Congress also
allowed “eligible contract participants” to trade foreign exchange options
and futures with each other because those large institutions or wealthy
individuals were not viewed to need regulatory protection.320
Unfortunately, the CFMA left a gaping hole through which the
fraudsters could continue their operations. The prohibitions in the CFMA
applied only to futures and options and not to spot or forward contracts
where delivery of the currency was called in the party’s contracts. The
scope of this loophole became clear in CFTC v. Zelener,321 a decision
rendered by the Seventh Circuit in 2004. In Zelener, the defendants were
selling foreign exchange as a principal to retail investors under contracts
that were to be settled within forty-eight hours of the sale. In fact, delivery
and payment rarely occurred. Instead, the contracts were rolled over
continually until the customer decided to recognize a gain or loss on the
position. That recognition was done through a cash settlement for the
amount of the gain or loss. The dealer never owned any foreign currency,
and no customer ever took delivery of any foreign currency. Nevertheless,
a customer could have demanded delivery, and the dealer would have been
obligated under its contract with the customer to make the delivery.322
The Seventh Circuit held in Zelener that these were not futures
contracts that were subject to retail foreign exchange provisions added by
the CFMA. The Court noted that the contracts were not standardized and
could not be traded on an exchange. Moreover, the contracts called for
actual delivery. The Court held that the fact that delivery was never made
did not mean that the obligation was not a cash contract.323 The decision in
Zelener was followed by the Sixth Circuit in a case involving retail foreign
currency contracts on which no delivery was ever taken. There, the Sixth
Circuit held that even though it was only “pretend” trading, the transactions
were not futures subject to CFTC regulation.324
The loophole recognized by these decisions proved to be a costly one.

320. See CFTC v. Zelener, 373 F.3d 861, 862-863 (7th Cir. 2004) (describing those
persons and reason for exemption).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 863.
323. Id. at 869. This approach of looking to the contract terms, rather than the actual
practices of the parties, had been previously used by the Supreme Court to distinguish
futures contracts from gambling operations. The Supreme Court held in those cases that
futures trading was not gambling because, even though the parties rarely took delivery, the
contracts when initiated required delivery of the underlying commodity. Board of Trade of
City of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905); Bibb v. Allen, 149
U.S. 481 (1893); Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397 (1896).
324. CFTC v. Erskine, 512 F.3d 309, 312 (6th Cir. 2008).
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Between 2001 and 2007 it was estimated that some 26,000 investors were
defrauded out of over $460 million as the result of foreign exchange
trading scams using OTC derivatives.325 The CFTC went so far as to issue
a public warning to consumers in both English and Spanish about this
widespread fraud.326 The CFTC also brought dozens of enforcement
actions but was continuously thwarted by the Zelener decision.327

325. Jerry W. Markham, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM ENRONERA SCANDALS TO THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2004-2006) 195 (2011).
326. CFTC No. 4127-98 CONSUMER ADVISORY ON FOREIGN CURRENCY TRADING (Mar.
30, 1998). See also, CFTC FOREIGN EXCHANGE CURRENCY FRAUD: CFTC/NASAA
INVESTOR
ALERT,
http://www.cftc.gov/consumerprotection/fraudawarenessprevention/foreigncurrencytrading/
cftcnasaaforexalert (detailing the widespread fraudulent transactions). This advisory
described how these scams work:
Forex scams attract customers with sophisticated-sounding offers placed in
newspaper advertisements, radio promotions, or on Internet sites. Promoters
often lure investors with the concept of leverage: the right to “control” a large
amount of foreign currency with an initial payment representing only a fraction
of the total cost. Coupled with predictions about supposedly inevitable increases
in currency prices, these contracts are said to offer huge returns over a short
time, with little or no downside risk.
In a typical case, investors may be assured of reaping tens of thousands of
dollars in just a few weeks or months, with an initial investment of only $5,000.
Often, the investor’s money is never actually placed in the market through a
legitimate dealer, but simply diverted—stolen— for the personal benefit of the
con artists.
Id.
327. The CFTC was able to obtain default or consent judgments and ex parte restraining
orders in numerous cases. See, e.g., CFTC v. UFOREX Consulting, LLC, Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶30,431 (W.D. La. 2006) (ordering a statutory restraining order against
defendant); CFTC v. Intertrade Forex, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,022 (M.D. Fla.
2005) (ordering default judgment for the CFTC); CFTC v. Richmond Global Associates,
LLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,027 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (ordering an ex parte statutory
restraining order freezing defendant’s assets); CFTC v. Premium Income Corp., LLC,
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,036 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (ordering an ex parte statutory
restraining order freezing defendant’s assets and permitting expedited discovery); CFTC v.
Sonoma Trading Corp., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,038 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (ordering an
ex parte statutory restraining order freezing defendant’s assets and permitting expedited
discovery); CFTC v. Ouyang, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,043 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
(ordering a permanent injunction and ancillary relief); CFTC v. Emerald Worldwide
Holdings, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,055 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (ordering default
judgment for the CFTC); CFTC v. G7 Advisory Services, LLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶30,056 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (ordering an an ex parte statutory restraining order freezing
defendant’s assets and permitting expedited discovery); CFTC v. Presidential FX, Inc.,
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,115 (E.D. Va. 2005) (ordering a preliminary injunction
enjoining defendant’s activities and other equitable relief); CFTC v. National Investment
Consultants, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,109 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (ordering an an ex
parte statutory restraining order freezing defendant’s assets and permitting expedited
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D. More Legislation
In the face of this crime wave, and after the stinging defeat in Zelener,
the CFTC sought and obtained additional legislation to reverse its effects.
The so-called “Zelener fix”328 was added to the CEA by the CFTC
Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Reauthorization Act of 2008).329 This fix
gave the CFTC regulatory authority over leveraged retail foreign exchange
contracts regardless of whether they are options or futures.330 However,
this authority did not extend to “the large, sophisticated interbank market or
to place additional requirements on businesses with a need to engage in
forex transactions in connection with their legitimate business activities.”331
The Reauthorization Act of 2008 authorized the CFTC to expand its
regulation of existing registrants that sell retail foreign exchange on a
leveraged basis. Those registrants included FCMs, commodity pool
operators and commodity trading advisors. A new category of registrant
was also created, i.e., retail foreign exchange dealers (RFEDs), who were
allowed to traffic in such transactions. These firms were required to have a
minimum capital of ten million dollars, which was increased to twenty
million dollars in 2009. FCMs selling these products were also subjected
to that capital requirement.332
discovery); CFTC v. International Currency Exchange, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶30,147 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (ordering an an ex parte statutory restraining order freezing
defendant’s assets and permitting expedited discovery). See also, JERRY W. MARKHAM,
COMMODITIES REGULATION FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS §27:14.30 (2014)
(describing numerous other such cases).
328. See Hearing to Review Implications of the CFTC v. Zelener Case Before the
Subcomm. on Gen. Farm Commodities and Risk Mgmt. of the Comm. on Agric., 111th
Cong.
(2009)
(describing
limitations
of
the
“Zelener
fix”),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg52664/html/CHRG-111hhrg52664.htm
[https://perma.cc/47A7-L9FV].
329. That statute was contained in the Food Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651 (2008).
330. See CFTC, Regulation of Off-Exchange Retail Foreign Exchange Transactions and
Intermediaries, 75 Fed. Reg. 3281, 3285 (Jan. 20, 2010) (describing the effects of this
amendment).
331. Id.
332. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.12, 1.17 (describing capital requirement for FCMs). The CFTC
has settled several cases brought against REFDs for minimum capital violations. See e,g.,
FXDirect Dealer, LLC, No. 14-28, 2014 WL 4793547 (C.F.T.C. 2014) (ordering
administrative proceedings where FX exchange dealer consented to findings of net capital
violations); Global Futures and Forex, Ltd., No. 14-17, 2014 WL 2121432 (C.F.T.C. 2014)
(ordering administrative proceedings where the net capital violation of a jointly registered
FCM/RFED on an unconsolidated basis was found by consent); IBFX, Inc., No. 15-10, 2014
WL 6988892 (C.F.T.C. 2014) (ordering administrative proceedings where net capital
violations by an FX dealer were found by consent); Capital Market Services, LLC, No. 1412, 2014 WL 1401405 (C.F.T.C. 2014) (same).
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These new requirements created an incentive for retail foreign
exchange dealers to move their operations to SEC regulated broker-dealers,
which were not subject to CFTC oversight. This caused the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the securities industry selfregulatory body, to issue a regulatory notice that advised broker-dealers
engaging in retail foreign exchange that such business was subject to its
rules. This notice pointed out that:
The primary forex market is the interbank market, in which large
banks, financial institutions and other eligible participants trade
currencies amongst themselves. In recent years, however, an
electronic, secondary over-the-counter (OTC) market has
developed. Retail customers participate in the secondary OTC
market with retail dealers, albeit typically at different prices and
with higher spreads than those that occur in the interbank
market.333
FINRA also warned of the dangers presented to retail customers by
these instruments:
The currency market is extremely volatile and retail forex
customers are exposed to substantial currency risk. Some
currencies are significantly more volatile than others. Many
forex dealers extend leverage to their customers at ratios of 400:1
or higher, which allows customers to control contracts worth
significantly more than their cash investment. The high leverage
ratios magnify even minor fluctuations in currency rates,
exponentially increasing a customer’s losses and gains. Even a
small move against a customer’s position can result in a
significant loss. Unlike margin in a securities account, forex
customers are typically closed out of their position once their loss
exceeds their initial investment. However, if, for any reason, the
position is not closed out at a zero balance, the customer could be
liable for additional losses.334
The FINRA notice stated that broker-dealers participating in the retail
foreign exchange market were subject to applicable FINRA rules.335 Those
rules require broker-dealers to comply with “just and equitable principles
of trade.”336 Among other things, those rules require a disclosure of the
risks of trading foreign currency and the effects of leverage. Those

333. FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, REGULATORY NOTICE 08-66:
RETAIL FOREIGN CURRENCY EXCHANGE (Nov. 2008).
334. Id.
335. Id. (emphasis added).
336. FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, RULE 2010: STANDARDS OF
COMMERCIAL HONOR AND PRINCIPLES OF TRADE.
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principles also prohibit false, exaggerated, unwarranted or misleading
communications with the public, which include projections or predictions
of profit or that past performance will recur.337
E. The Dodd-Frank Act
The next legislative step was to clarify jurisdiction over retail OTC
foreign exchange trading on a leveraged basis and without actual delivery.
This was done through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).338 That act divided jurisdiction over
these instruments among the CFTC, SEC, and banking regulators. Those
agencies then adopted rules to implement this authority.339
The CFTC promulgated a number of rules under Dodd-Frank for retail
OTC foreign exchange transactions.340 Those rules did not apply to
commercial trading in the interbank foreign exchange market, to
transactions between large commercial or financial institutions known as
eligible contract participants (ECPs), or to foreign exchange options or
futures trading on regulated commodity exchanges. To prevent evasion,
commodity pools were not allowed to claim ECP status if they directly
enter into retail foreign currency transactions with retail customers and
have one or more direct participants that are not ECPs.341
Among other things, the CFTC rules prohibit fraud,342 require that
investors in these transactions be given a prescribed risk disclosure
statement,343 continue to require minimum adjusted net capital for dealers
of at least twenty million dollars,344 continue minimum margin
requirements,345 require risk assessments by dealers346 and set trading and
operational standards.347 Dealers were required to register with the industry
self-regulatory body, the National Futures Association (NFA), and be

337. See supra note 335 (explaining the notice).
338. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat 1376-2223 (2010).
339. See Markham, supra note 327 (describing this legislation and the rules adopted by
the regulators under its provisions).
340. 17 C.F.R. § 5.1.
341. Further Definition of ‘‘Swap Dealer,’’ ‘‘Security- Based Swap Dealer,’’ ‘‘Major
Swap Participant,’’ ‘‘Major Security- Based Swap Participant’’ and ‘‘Eligible Contract
Participant,’’ Exchange Act Release 34-66868 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,646–647 (May 23,
2012).
342. 17 C.F.R. § 5.2 (2015).
343. 17 C.F.R. § 5.5 (2015).
344. 17 C.F.R. §§ 5.6, 5.7 (2015).
345. 17 C.F.R. § 5.9 (2015).
346. 17 C.F.R. §§ 5.10 & 5.11 (2015).
347. 17 C.F.R. § 5.18 (2015)
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subject to its rules.348
The NFA had previously adopted rules governing OTC trading in
retail foreign exchange transactions by its members.349 Those transactions
were defined in NFA rules as OTC foreign exchange transactions that are
entered into on a leveraged or margin basis and that do not involve large
institutions identified as ECPs, transactions where actual delivery of
currency is made within two days or where a forward contract requires
actual delivery between two parties having the ability to make or take
delivery.
NFA rules, among other things, require its members to “observe high
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of
trade . . . .”350 This prohibition extends to fraudulent conduct and requires
diligent supervision of employees marketing retail foreign currency.351
Marketing materials for retail foreign currency transactions are subject to
review by the NFA.352 Financial information on dealers is required to be
submitted to the NFA.353 Dealers are also required to warn customers that
in the event of the dealer’s insolvency there would be no account insurance
and the customer would be treated only as a general creditor.354
In August 2015, the CFTC approved amendments to NFA rules that
sought to enhance protections for retail foreign exchange customers dealing
with NFA Forex Dealer Members (FDMs). The CFTC described those
amendments as:
(1) imposing additional capital requirements on FDMs; (2)
requiring FDMs to collect security deposits for off-exchange
foreign currency transactions from eligible contract participant
counterparties in addition to retail counterparties; (3) requiring
FDMs to adopt and implement rigorous risk management
programs; and (4) requiring FDMs to provide additional market
disclosures and firm-specific information on their websites to
permit current and potential counterparties to better assess the
risks of engaging in off-exchange foreign currency transactions
348. 17 C.F.R. § 5.22 (2015).
349. NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION, FOREX TRANSACTIONS: A REGULATORY GUIDE,
BYLAW 1057 (Feb. 13, 2007). NFA rules governed the marketing and other practices of its
members. However, retail foreign currency dealers that are not registered with the CFTC as
a FCM were not required to be members.
350. NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION, FOREX TRANSACTIONS: A REGULATORY GUIDE,
RULE 2-36 (2011).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION, FOREX DEALER MEMBER REQUIREMENTS FOR
WEEKLY FOREX REPORTS AND BANKRUPTCY DISCLOSURE, NFA NOTICE TO MEMBERS I-06-13
(Aug. 1, 2006).
354. Id.
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and with conducting business with a particular FDM.355
The SEC adopted a rule that subjected retail foreign exchange
transactions to its existing rules and to those of FINRA, where the dealer
was a registered broker-dealer.356
The SEC, noted, however, that
transactions in which the currency was actually delivered within two days
and forward transactions involving actual delivery would not be retail
foreign exchange transactions subject to its regulation.357
The Federal Reserve Board (Fed) also adopted rules allowing banks to
engage in retail foreign exchange transactions. Among other things, those
rules require member banks to be well capitalized,358 and they must notify
the Fed if they offer such products.359 Fraud is prohibited,360 and customers
are required to be given a prescribed risk disclosure statement that discloses
the percentage of customers losing and making money in retail foreign
currency transactions through the bank.361 A minimum margin of two
percent of the notional amount of retail foreign exchange transactions was
imposed for major currencies and five percent for other currencies.362
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) adopted rules
for retail foreign exchange transactions that largely tracked those of the
Fed.363 The OCC required banks offering these products to first obtain its
permission to do so.364
The FDIC adopted a similar regulatory
framework.365
VI.

FUNCTIONAL REGULATION BREAKDOWN

A. Functional Regulation
The United States has developed a functional system for the regulation
of financial services. This regulatory structure seeks to assure that the

355. Press Release, CFTC Approves National Futures Association Rules Enhancing
Protections
for
Retail
Forex
Customers
(Aug.
27,
2015),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7219-15 [https://perma.cc/28EM-6G7Q].
356. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b12-1 (2014). This rule stated that it would expire on July 31,
2016, which provides the SEC an opportunity to assess its effects before renewing it. Id.
357. Id.
358. 12 C.F.R. § 240.8 (2015).
359. 12 C.F.R. § 240.4 (2015).
360. 12 C.F.R. § 240.3 (2015).
361. 12 C.F.R. § 240.6 (2015).
362. 12 C.F.R. § 349.9 (2012).
363. 12 C.F.R. § 48.1 (2014).
364. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Retail Foreign Exchange
Transactions, 76 Fed. Reg. 41, 375 (July 14, 2011).
365. 12 C.F.R. § 349.1 (2014).
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same financial product is regulated by a designated regulator wherever the
product is traded. Functional regulation thus seeks to compartmentalize
particular financial services activities into regulatory boxes that do not
overlap. For example, the SEC is assigned the role of regulating the
securities markets, the CFTC is tasked with regulating commodity futures
and options markets, and bank regulators, such as the Federal Reserve
Board and the Comptroller of the Currency, are given the responsibility for
regulating the business of banking.366
There have been some deviations from the functional regulation model
in the U.S. For example, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was
amended in 1975 to impose regulation by the SEC over the clearing,
settlement and transfer of stocks in the securities market.367 That
legislation was accompanied by a turf war with the bank regulators who did
not want the SEC regulating bank clearing and settlement activities.368 A
compromise was reached in which stock clearing, settlements and transfers
engaged in by banks would be regulated by the “appropriate regulatory
agency.”369 The “appropriate regulatory agency” was allowed to adopt and
enforce its own rules governing clearing and transfer of stock.370 However,
a slight nod was given to functional regulation through requirements that
the SEC and the appropriate regulatory consult and cooperate with each
other and give each other advance notice of proposed rules governing
clearing and transfers.371
The Government Securities Act of 1986 was another step away from
functional regulation.372 That legislation subjected non-banks acting as
dealers in government securities to regulation by the SEC. However,
financial institutions, such as banks, were placed outside the SEC’s reach.
Instead, financial institutions became subject to regulation by the
“appropriate regulatory agency.”373 The Treasury Department was tasked
366. See Functional Regulation: A Concept for Glass-Steagall Reform?, 2 STAN J. L.
BUS. & FIN. 89 (1995) (discussing functional regulation).
367. 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (2010). The Securities Exchange Act defines a clearing agency
as a person acting as an intermediary in making payments or deliveries of securities
transactions or who compares data concerning the settlement of securities transactions. The
definition also includes custodians or depositories of securities at a central location. 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(24) (2010).
368. At that time, there were some 800 bank transfer agents and some 2,700 non-bank
transfer agents. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, BROKER DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES
AND COMMODITIES LAW: FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES, CREDIT REGULATION, AND CUSTOMER
PROTECTION § 13:2 (2014) (describing this jurisdictional fight).
369. 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Pub. L. No. 99-571, 100 Stat. 3208 (Oct. 28, 1986).
373. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5.
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with adopting rules to govern the operations of government securities
dealers and brokers.374 Those rules were to address the financial
responsibility, protection of customer securities and balances,
recordkeeping and reporting of brokers and dealers in government
securities.375
The Treasury Department largely adopted SEC broker-dealer rules as
the basis for the protection of customer funds associated with trading in
government securities.376 This seemed to be an effort to preserve functional
regulation by using the same or similar regulation for the same product but
deviated from that principle by employing more than one regulator to
regulate the same function, using different rules. For example, the
Treasury Department’s capital rule allowed government securities brokerdealers registered with the SEC to comply with the SEC’s capital rule and
financial institutions to comply with bank regulator capital requirements.377
That was a deviation from functional regulation because those capital
computations were quite different in approach.378
The passage of the Gramm-Leach–Bliley Act (GLB) in 1999 was
another blow to functional regulation.379 GLB repealed the Glass-Steagall
Act of 1933, which had tried to define and limit the business of banking to
the acceptance of deposits and making loans.380 However, the GlassSteagall barriers were gradually breached over a period of several decades
as banks sought to expand their financial services into the securities and
other financial markets. Those actions were often challenged in court, but
the banks continued their relentless efforts to expand their financial
services into the securities and other markets.381 Congress finally threw in
the towel in 1999 with the passage of GLB.

374. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5 (b).
375. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 400.1 (2006) (outlining Treasury Department Regulations for
government securities dealers and brokers).
376. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 403.4 (implementing broker-dealer rules in this fashion).
377. 17 C.F.R. § 402.1 (2014).
378. For a time, the SEC allowed certain broker-dealers that were a part of a
consolidated supervised entity to use the Basel Committee’s capital requirement. However,
those firms either failed (e.g., Lehman Brothers) or became banks (Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs) or were acquired by banks (Merrill Lynch) during the Financial Crisis in
2008, and that provision was repealed. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, BROKER DEALER
OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW: FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES,
CREDIT REGULATION, AND CUSTOMER PROTECTION §4:42.50 (2014) (describing that rule and
its failure).
379. Gramm-Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12,
1999).
380. Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (June 16, 1933).
381. See also Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis—A Test Match for the Bankers,
12 U. PENN. L. & BUS. J. 1081, 1095, 1103 (2010) (describing those cases).
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There was an effort to preserve at least some aspects of functional
regulation in GLB by requiring banks to push their securities business out
of the bank and into an affiliated broker-dealer that would be regulated by
the SEC.382 Nevertheless, a number of securities market activities were
carved out of these “push out” requirements. This allowed the bank itself
to conduct those activities without regulation by the SEC. Those activities
included transactions in U.S government securities, trust investment
activities, municipal bond transactions, certain transactions in asset backed
debt, commercial paper, dividend reinvestment plans, sweep accounts,
stock purchase plans and stock custody arrangements.383 This push out
meant that those activities would not be regulated functionally.
More slippage in functional regulation occurred with the enactment of
the CFMA in 2000.384 The SEC and CFTC set the boundaries of their
respective jurisdictions in 1982 based only somewhat on functional
regulation grounds, foreign currency being a deviation from that
principle.385 At that time, the two agencies could not agree on who should
regulate futures on single stocks, for example IBM. As a result of that
disagreement, trading on such instruments was prohibited until the
enactment of the CFMA in 2000. The CFMA deviated from the functional
regulation approach by allowing trading in single stock futures on both
commodity and stock exchanges, separately regulated respectively by the
CFTC and SEC. The place of its trading, rather than the functional
product, thus determined whether the CFTC or SEC had jurisdiction to
regulate. In order to preserve some aspects of functional regulation, the
SEC and CFTC were required to jointly adopt regulations for single stock
futures.386 However, that arrangement still left some regulatory differences.
For example, an investor trading a single stock future on a stock exchange
would have the protection of SIPC insurance. SIPC provides up to
$500,000 in insurance to cover losses caused by a broker-dealer’s
insolvency. A customer trading the same single stock future on a DCM

382. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(5).
383. Id. Many banks are still subject to indirect regulation by the SEC when they
become public companies. In such cases the bank must register its securities with the SEC
and is subject to the SEC’s periodic reporting requirements. See, e.g., Bank of America
Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2009) (exemplifying Bank of America’s
compliance with SEC reporting requirements).
384. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763, §102 (2000).
385. Markham, supra note 300 and accompanying text (describing the division of
jurisdiction between SEC and CFTC).
386. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(1)(D), 17 C.F.R. § 41.41 (implementing the dual regulation of this
product).
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would have no such protection.387
The use of multiple regulators for the same product expanded with the
manipulation of California electricity prices by Enron and other energy
companies in 2000 and 2001.388 The CFTC brought a number of
manipulation actions as a result of those activities.389 It was joined by the
Justice Department in some of those cases. One such case was brought
against BP Products of North America Inc. (BP). That company paid $178
million to settle CFTC charges and an additional $125 million to settle
criminal charges over the same conduct—a total of $303 million.390
However, the Fifth Circuit threw out a criminal case brought against the BP
traders who engaged in the conduct that was the subject of those
settlements, finding that the trading was not subject to regulation under the
CEA.391
The SEC and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
also made an appearance in these prosecutions. The SEC claimed that
manipulative trades by the energy companies had inflated the earnings they
reported in their SEC filings.392 FERC claimed that these activities violated
its competition requirements for pipelines and regulated utilities. Reliant
Resources, Inc., (Reliant), for example, was the subject of enforcement
proceedings by the SEC, the CFTC, and FERC. Reliant paid $50 million to
settle the FERC charges and $18 million to settle the CFTC claims. It
additionally agreed to pay $445 million to settle claims brought by the
attorney generals of various states. The Justice Department also criminally
prosecuted Reliant, but those charges were later dropped.393
Congress responded to these actions in a non-functional way. Instead
of consolidating regulation of energy trading into a single regulator, in

387. The differences in the regulation of single stock futures by the SEC and CFTC are
described in a uniform disclosure statement that must be given to customers of those
products. See 67 Fed. Reg. 64176 (Oct. 17, 2002) (describing disclosure statement). See
also Risk Disclosure Statement for Security Futures Contracts, NFA Compliance Rule 230(B), (Rev. Jan. 3, 2011) (describing disclosure and risk information in the National
Futures Association manual).
388. See Jerry W. Markham & Lawrence Hunt Jr., The California Energy Crisis—
Enron’s Gaming of Governor Gray’s Imperfect Market, 24 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP.
1 (2004) (describing those manipulations).
389. See Jerry W. Markham, Lawrence Hunt Jr., & Michael S. Sackheim, Market
Manipulation—From Star Chamber to Lone Star Chamber, 23 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L.
REP. 7 (2003) (describing those cases).
390. CFTC Press Release No. 5405-07, BP Agrees to Pay a Total of $303 Million in
Sanctions to Settle Charges of Manipulation and Attempted Manipulation in the Propane
Market (Oct. 25, 2007) (on file with CFTC).
391. United States v. Radley, 632 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2011).
392. See MARKHAM, supra note 289 (describing these actions).
393. Id. at 281-282.
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2005, Congress granted FERC greater powers to attack energy price
manipulations394 through language that tracked the provisions of the SEC’s
anti-manipulation provisions in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.395 Not satisfied with that expansion of manipulative authority,
Congress acted again in 2006 to give the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
the same anti-manipulation powers that it gave FERC for energy price
manipulations and which was later granted to the CFTC by the Dodd-Frank
Act in 2010.396 This means that four regulators (CFTC, SEC, FERC, FTC),
plus the Justice Department have the same powers for regulating energy
price manipulations. They will undoubtedly engage in duplicative actions
in future energy manipulation cases, as they have in the past.397
These breakdowns to the functional regulation model bloomed into
something much greater in the Dodd-Frank Act. That legislation allocated
jurisdiction over previously unregulated swap transactions between the
SEC and CFTC.398 The CFTC was given jurisdiction over commodity
based swaps, while the SEC assumed control over security based swaps.399
This meant that swaps as a financial tool were not regulated functionally.
The jurisdictional line between the SEC and CFTC was not drawn on the
instrument being traded, i.e., the swap. Rather, jurisdiction was allocated
on the basis of the underlying asset that is the subject of the swap, i.e.,
commodity swaps for the CFTC and security swaps for the SEC. There is
nothing functional in such an approach. It was also wasteful in application.
While the SEC and CFTC engaged in some joint rulemaking in defining
swaps and swap market participants,400 they went their separate ways in
promulgating business conduct rules for swaps falling within their
respective regulatory reach.401

394. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1283, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
395. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
396. Energy Independence and Security Act, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492
(2007).
397. Indeed, FERC and the CFTC have already engaged in a war over whether they had
concurrent jurisdiction over a large energy trader who was alleged to be manipulating
natural gas futures. The D.C. Circuit ruled that the CFTC had exclusive jurisdiction over
energy futures. Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
398. See Markham, supra note 321, at A-51 (describing this legislation).
399. Id.
400. This joint rulemaking was done in consultation with the Federal Reserve Board.
See, Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap
Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant” and “Eligible Contract Participant”,
77 Fed. Reg. 30, 596 (May 23, 2012) (comprising the joint final rule).
401. See 17 C.F.R. § 23.400 (describing the CFTC swap business conduct rules). The
SEC proposed such business conduct rules in 2011 but has not adopted those rules as of July
10, 2015; SEC, Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major
Security-Based Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,396 (July 18, 2011) (describing business
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This move away from functional regulation was even more
pronounced in allocating regulation of the foreign exchange market. As
described above, The Futures Trading Act of 1982 and the Reauthorization
Act of 2008402 acted to open up foreign exchange trading to SEC regulated
broker-dealers.403 As also described above, the Dodd-Frank Act went
further and allocated jurisdiction over retail foreign exchange derivatives
among the SEC, the CFTC, the OCC, the Federal Reserve Board and the
FDIC, who were joined by the NFA and FINRA.404 The Dodd-Frank Act
allocation of this jurisdiction was not functionally based. Rather, it was
entity specific regulation, i.e., broker-dealers selling retail foreign exchange
options are subject to the regulation of the SEC, FCMs selling the same
product are subject to the rules of the CFTC, and banks offering the
identical product are subject to the rules of the bank regulators. As the
CFTC staff has noted, Dodd-Frank:
permits several types of entities to act as counterparties to retail
forex transactions, [but] the question of who regulates the activity
depends on the type of entity offering to be the counterparty. For
example, SEC-registered brokers or dealers doing retail forex
transactions are regulated by the SEC and financial institutions
are regulated by banking regulators. The CEA provides that the
CFTC has jurisdiction over [futures commission merchants],
[retail foreign exchange dealers], or entities that are not otherwise
regulated.405
B. A Reassessment of Business Conduct Regulation is Needed
The functional system of regulation employed in the U.S. was largely
the result of legislation that was passed in the 1930s, at a time when
financial services were segmented and had little overlap.406 These
separated financial services were carried out by distinct entities such as
conduct standards).
402. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1982), Food
Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651 (2008).
403. Id.
404. Markham, supra note 300 and accompanying text (detailing allocation of
jurisdiction).
405. CFTC Office of Public Affairs, Q & A-Final Retail Foreign Exchange Rules (Sept.
10, 2010). Meanwhile, the Treasury Department continues to have exclusive jurisdiction
over all players in the commercial interbank foreign currency market. See S. Rep. No. 931131 (1974) (describing the Treasury Amendment); Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465 (1997)
(describing the Treasury Amendment and CFTC jurisdiction).
406. That legislation included the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 1), the
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. § 1) and the Glass-Steagall Act that was
passed in 1933 (Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162).

ARTICLE 4 (MARKHAM) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

REGULATING THE MONEYCHANGERS

5/22/16 9:11 PM

855

broker-dealers for securities, futures commission merchants for futures and
banks for taking deposits and making loans. However, some large banks
broke that separation in the 1920s through the use of affiliates that acted as
broker-dealers. The activities of those affiliates were harshly criticized in
hearings that led to the passage of the New Deal legislation regulating
financial services. The Glass-Steagall Act sought to restore the wall
between banking and securities by banning banks from engaging in some
securities market activities.407
The barriers erected by Glass-Steagall that separated the banking and
securities markets began breaking down in the 1960s, when large
commercial and investment banks began expanding their offerings of
financial services.408
Similarly, the futures exchanges, which had
traditionally traded only agricultural futures, began trading futures and
options on financial instruments. Today, futures and other derivative
markets are largely devoted to the trading of financial derivatives.409
Functional regulation was not a good fit for this evolving market structure.
Instead of a single regulator, or group of regulators in the case of banking,
large financial services firms and their affiliates were saddled with multiple
regulators with separate and sometimes conflicting rules.
This multiplication of regulators burgeoned during the Financial Crisis
in 2008. Goldman Sachs, for example, was once regulated only by the
SEC, but during that crisis it became a bank that is now regulated by
banking regulators, as well as the SEC and CFTC. Morgan Stanley
underwent the same metamorphosis. Other large banks also face this same
multiple regulator approach. For example, Bank of America was involved
in capital market activities before the Financial Crisis and was subject to
SEC and CFTC regulation, as well as bank regulation. That cross sector
role was expanded by Bank of America during the Financial Crisis when it
acquired Merrill Lynch, one of the largest broker-dealers in the world.410
This duplicative and overlapping regulatory structure has led to the
anomaly of multiple enforcement actions by multiple regulators against the
same large banks. This multiple regulator role has resulted in the now
familiar recurring announcements of mega-settlements by those banks with
407. Markham, supra note 383 at 1091-1095 (describing the legislative history of the
Glass-Steagall Act).
408. See id. at 1081, 1095, 1102 (describing the efforts of banks and broker-dealers to
expand into each other’s traditional domains).
409. See Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of
Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 865, 873-874
(2008) (describing that transformation).
410. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE
SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE GREAT RECESSION (2006-2009) 546-557 (2011) (describing those
developments).
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those regulators. These so-called “parallel” actions (i.e., “independent
investigations conducted by civil regulatory agencies and federal
prosecutors relating to the same set of operative facts and
circumstances”)411 were fairly limited before the scandals that emerged
after the bankruptcy of the Enron Corp. in 2001. Those scandals spread
from the energy markets that Enron was manipulating to several financial
services firms.412 Before the Enron era scandals, the SEC would file its
own civil actions and make a simultaneous criminal reference to the
Department of Justice in particularly serious cases of fraud, but such dual
actions were infrequent. That changed with the failure of Enron in 2001
and the financial services scandals that arose in its wake. In 1999, there
were sixty-four such referrals. That number ballooned to 259 in 2002.413
The Department of Justice became an active regulator of financial
services firms during the Enron era scandals by doling out large fines for
violations of regulatory requirements and by coordinating the multiple
actions of other regulators. The Enron era scandals resulted in a Corporate
Fraud Task Force in 2002 that was headed by the Department of Justice
and included representatives from the SEC, CFTC and other regulators.
They began joint investigations and parallel criminal and civil proceedings
on a broad scale, and that Task Force has continued to expand.414
The Justice Department website identified the following as members
of the Corporate Fraud Task Force in 2008:
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division
Assistant Attorney General Tax Division
United States Attorney for the Central District of California
United States Attorney for the Northern District of California
United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
United States Attorney for the Southern District of Texas . . . .

411. WilmerHale, The Perils of Parallel Proceedings—Is There Light at the End of the
Tunnel?
(April
2006),
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/Editorial/Pu
blication/ICL_BriefSeries_042106.pdf [https://perma.cc/63KR-F79T] (accessed on May 19,
2015).
412. Markham, supra note 195 at 496 (describing those scandals).
413. WilmerHale, Parallel Criminal and SEC Prosecution Present New Risks for Public
Companies
and
their
Officers
and
Directors
(August
19,
2003),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=90061
[https://perma.cc/M62C-G3YS] (accessed on May 19, 2015).
414. Id.
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The Secretary of Labor
The Department of Housing and Urban Development
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Comptroller of the Currency
The Director of Office of Thrift Supervision
The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP)
The Chairman of the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission
The Chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission
The Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
The Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission
The Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
The Chief Inspector of the United States Postal Inspection
Service
The Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency.415
In 2009, in the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis, the Corporate Fraud
Task Force was renamed the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force
(Task Force) and was expanded to include six more federal agencies. The
Task Force then included ninety-four U.S. attorneys offices and numerous
“state and local partners.”416 This reference to “state and local partners”
recognizes that, in addition to federal regulators, financial services firms
are subject to further oversight by state banking commissions, if they are a
state bank, fifty-state securities administrators,417 fifty-state state attorney
generals, the same number of state insurance regulators and, in the case of
New York, a Department of Financial Services that is charged with, among
other things, “fighting financial fraud.”418
The inclusion of state officials among the host of federal financial
services regulators was another product of the Enron-era scandals. Serving

415. Department of Justice Archives, The President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force,
http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/ [https://perma.cc/MX3X-DMB4] (accessed on May
18, 2015).
416. About the Task Force, STOPFRAUD.GOV: FIN. FRAUD ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE,
http://www.stopfraud.gov/about.html [https://perma.cc/R82P-65JR] (last visited May 18,
2015).
417. See Kenneth I. Denos, Blue and Gray Skies: The National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 Makes the Case for Uniformity in State Securities Law, 1997
UTAH L. REV. 101 (1997) (explaining that the titular legislation preempted state securities
laws with respect to actively traded securities regulated by the SEC).
418. About Us, N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERV., http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/dfs_about.htm
[https://perma.cc/DV25-UB7C] (last visited May 16, 2015).
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as attorney general in New York during that period, Eliot Spitzer brought
numerous high profile cases against financial institutions, often in
competition with the SEC.419 The press Spitzer garnered from those
prosecutions catapulted him into the New York governor’s mansion and
made him a viable candidate for the Presidency, that is until a scandal led
to his downfall.420 Other state officials joined the fray during the Enron-era
scandals. For example, a wolf pack of forty state officials joined Spitzer in
an investigation of financial analysts employed by several large investment
banks. Those state regulators drew lots to determine which regulators
would lead investigations of particular investment banks. Utah drew
Goldman Sachs as its target, which must have raised some eyebrows in
Goldman’s New York headquarters.421 Those investigations led to a
massive settlement by several large investment banks in which they agreed
to pay $1.4 billion to New York and to a long list of state and federal
regulators.422
The financial analyst settlement became the model for the massive
fines imposed by multiple regulators in the wake of the Financial Crisis of
2008. For example, a few years after that settlement, another pack of thirty
state attorney generals joined the CFTC, bank regulators, and the
Department of Justice in investigating the manipulation of the Libor and
other benchmark interest rates by several large banks.423 Regulators from
the U.K, Japan, Europe, Canada and Singapore were also involved.424
Those investigations resulted in billions of dollars in settlements.425 In one
settlement, Deutsche Bank agreed to pay $2.5 billion to settle claims over
interest rate manipulation that were brought by the CFTC, the Justice
Department, the New York Department of Financial Services, and the UK
Financial Conduct Authority; Deutsche Bank had previously paid nearly $1
billion to settle claims by the European Union over interest rate
manipulations.426
419. See MARKHAM, supra note 196, at 411 (describing Spitzer’s prosecutions and his
rise and fall as a national figure).
420. Id. at xxxi.
421. Id. at 411-412.
422. Id. at 416.
423. Jean Eaglesham, Ruling in Rate Probe Doesn’t Slow Cases, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4,
2013, at C1.
424. See MARKHAM, supra note 289, at 341 (further describing those investigations).
425. See supra notes 198, 200, and 201 (summarizing various settlements reached for
billion dollar amounts).
426. Eyk Henning & David Enrich, Deutsche Bank to Pay $2.5 Billion to Settle Libor
Investigation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2015. The CFTC and Department of Justice entered into
a $453 million settlement with Barclays PLC in June 2012. The bank was charged with
attempting to manipulate the Libor rate by inserting artificially low quotes in the index
during the Financial Crisis. That action was taken to aid trading positions and to conceal
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The November 2014 foreign exchange manipulation case settlement
for $4.3 billion, which is described above,427 involved six banks and
various domestic and foreign regulators (i.e., the CFTC, the OCC, the U.K
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Swiss Financial Market
Supervisory Authority).428 The large BONY foreign exchange settlement
involved the New York and Florida attorney generals, the Justice
Department, the Labor Department and the SEC.429
After those
settlements, Brazil announced that its antitrust authorities were
investigating fifteen large international banks, including several of those
involved in the foreign exchange and Libor settlements, to determine if
they were manipulating currency exchange rates.430
from the market that Barclays was paying higher rates in order to attract funds. Alexander
Alper & Kristin Ridley, Barclays Paying $453 million to Settle Libor Probe, REUTERS, June
27, 2012. On December 19, 2012, A UBS AG subsidiary in Japan pleaded guilty to a
criminal charge for manipulating the Libor rate. UBS also agreed to pay civil and criminal
fines totaling $1.5 billion to settle interest rate charges made by U.S., U.K. and Swiss
authorities. David Enrich & Jean Eaglesham, UBS Admits Rigging Rates in ‘Epic’ Plot,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2012. The Royal Bank of Scotland agreed to pay $612 million to
settle charges brought by U.S. and U.K. authorities over its Libor rate manipulations. Matt
Scuffham & Kristin Ridley, Exclusive: RBS Fined $612 Million for Rate Rigging, REUTERS,
Feb. 6, 2013. U.S. and U.K. regulators fined ICAP, an inter-dealer broker, $87 million for
the alleged manipulation of the Libor. Kristin Ridley, Clare Hutchison & Aruna
Viswanatha, ICAP Fined $87 Million Over Libor, Three Former Staff Charged, REUTERS,
Sept. 25, 2013. In October 2013, the Dutch Rabobank agreed to pay $1 billion to settle
charges that it manipulated the Libor rate. That settlement was with the CFTC, the U.S.
Department of Justice, the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority and Dutch regulators. Chad
Bray, Dutch Bank Settles Case Over Libor Deceptions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2013. In
December 2013, European Union regulators fined six large financial institutions $2.32
billion for manipulating the Libor rate. Those firms included JPMorgan, Citigroup,
Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland and Société Générale S.A., some of which were
later targeted for the same conduct by other regulators. Vanessa Mock & David Enrich, EU
Fines 6 Firms on Rates – Total Penalty of $2.32 Billion is Bloc’s Largest in Case Against
Cartel, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2013. Lloyds Banking Group PLC agreed to pay $370 million
to U.S. and U.K. authorities in July 2014 to settle charges over its alleged repo rate
manipulations. Max Colchester, Lloyds Settles Rate-Rig Probe, WALL ST. J., Jul. 29, 2014.
427. See FCA, supra note 203 (detailing the relevant case against banks whose traders
attempted to manipulate market currency rates).
428. See Ring & Vaughan, supra note 204 (detailing the regulatory bodies involved in
the settlement reports).
429. See supra notes 217 and 218 (accounting for the separate actions brought by the
Justice Department, the Department of Labor, the SEC, New York attorney general, and the
Florida attorney general).
430. Guillermo Parra-Bernal & Leonardo Goy, Brazil Probes Currency Market Activity
of 15 Global Banks, REUTERS, July 2, 2015. Another storm is brewing over claims that
large banks manipulated the market for U.S. Treasury securities. A class action lawsuit
filed in July 2015 has charged that twenty-two large banks and financial services firms that
act as primary dealers in that market manipulated their prices in 2012. The Treasury market
is valued at $12.5 trillion, so this will be no small matter, and the press was reporting an
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As exemplified by the foreign exchange manipulation cases, parallel
proceedings have become the norm for prosecuting large financial
institutions. However, it is hard to fathom the value of this redundant
regulation by multiple regulators of the same banks. It serves no useful
purpose other than to milk banks, regardless of guilt or harm, for billions of
dollars that they must pay in order to preserve their franchise, which
depends on multiple government licenses (e.g. FCM, broker-dealer and
banking registrations). These settlements merely act as a random tax on
those institutions, a tax that is borne by innocent shareholders in the form
of reduced earnings, which diminish stock value and dividends. Consumers
will also bear some of this burden as they will be charged increased fees to
offset the effects of those massive fines.431
Reform is necessary, but for the approximately twenty-five financial
regulatory reform efforts that occurred after World War II, attempts at
reform have all been unsuccessful.432 Reform efforts seemed to have
gained some traction in this century when, in 2004, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) published a report on regulatory reform in
which it stated that “some have questioned whether a fragmented
regulatory system is appropriate in today’s environment, particularly with
large, complex firms managing their risks on a consolidated basis.”433
The GAO report was followed by an extended and extensive review of
the effectiveness of functional regulation by the Treasury Department that
was concluded in 2007. The Treasury Department then urged that

investigation by the Justice Department of these claims. Jonathan Stempel, Lawsuit Accuses
22 Banks of Manipulating U.S. Treasury Auctions, REUTERS, July 23, 2015. This is not the
first time that the Treasury market has been manipulated. In 1992, Paul Mozer, a trader at
Salomon Brothers, now a part of Citigroup, was the subject of criminal charges for
manipulating the two-year Treasury market through massive purchases of those notes at
Treasury auctions. The Treasury Department had limited the amount of notes or bonds that
any one dealer could purchase at a Treasury auction for two-year notes to 35 percent of the
offering. Mozer used customer accounts without their permission to buy 86 percent of the
May 1992 two-year Treasury note auction. In one auction, Mozer entered an unauthorized
order for $1 billion for the account of a single customer. Mozer was sent to jail for four
months and his firm was fined $290 million. See MARKHAM, supra note 289, at 252-253
(2014) (describing that and other Treasury market manipulation cases).
431. The disposition of these fines is another matter that needs examination. In England,
the government was using the Libor settlement for such things as giving the “hippie scouts”
some $750,000 to teach children about peace and cooperation through parachute games and
musical chairs. Another $1.5 million was given to support a celebration of the battle of
Agincourt. Money was also given to a “therapeutic baker” for veterans. Margot Patrick,
England’s Bank Fines Are a Boon for a Happy Few – Agincourt Celebration, ‘hippie
scouts’ get some of $1 billion in Libor cash, WALL ST. J. May 30, 2015.
432. A Former Central Banker Turns on His Own Kind, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 2015.
433. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-61, INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT
NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2004).
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functional regulation be abandoned on the basis that it was ineffective and
costly.434 The Treasury Secretary recommended a consolidation of U.S.
financial services regulation into three bodies, viz., (1) a market stability
regulator, which would be the Federal Reserve Board empowered to set
monetary policy and monitor systemic economic threats; (2) a prudential
financial regulator, which would oversee government insured banks and
broker-dealers and adopt rules for the protection of those industries’
government insurance funds (FDIC and SIPC); and (3) a business conduct
regulator that would regulate business conduct across all financial
services.435 As an interim step the Department’s report recommended the
consolidation of the CFTC and SEC.436
The Financial Crisis of 2008 killed any possibility of enactment of the
Treasury Department’s recommended reforms, which may seem strange.
The multiple regulators involved in that crisis were anything but functional,
finding themselves often at odds with each other during the crisis and doing
nothing to prevent or anticipate the crisis.437 Yet, instead of reducing the
number of regulators, Congress added even more with the passage of the
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. Among other things, Dodd-Frank created the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which now enforces
federal consumer financial laws such as prohibitions against credit
discrimination.438 The CFPB is already following the now familiar path of
parallel and redundant enforcement actions.439 Dodd-Frank also created a
new super-regulator, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC),
whose members and advisors comprise a broad range of federal and state
financial services regulators; FSOC is responsible for regulating
systemically important financial services firms.440 However, most of those
businesses are financial services firms that are already intensively regulated

434. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE (2008).
435. Id. at 139-144.
436. Id. at 106-111.
437. See MARKHAM, supra note 412 (describing those failures).
438. About
Us,
CONSUMER
FINANCIAL
PROTECTION
BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ [https://perma.cc/KGP4-JSC8] (last visited
June 28, 2015).
439. For example, in January 2015 CFPB announced a joint investigation with the
Maryland attorney general and Maryland Insurance Administration that resulted in joint
settlement with Wells Fargo and JPMorgan Chase for $35.7 million. CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB TAKES ACTION AGAINST WELLS FARGO AND JPMORGAN CHASE
FOR ILLEGAL MORTGAGE KICKBACKS, (2015).
440. See Jerry W. Markham, The Financial Stability Oversight Council—Risk Manager
or Debating Society?, 33 THE CAPCO INST. J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 35 (2011) (describing
the role and participants in FSOC).
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by multiple other regulators.441
The functional multiple regulator approach taken by the U.S. has not
been followed by the rest of the world. At the turn of the century, the
United Kingdom consolidated multiple regulators and self-regulators for
financial services into a single body, the Financial Services Authority
(FSA).442 Indeed, most other countries followed that model. However, the
FSA was heavily criticized for its lax regulation before and during the
Financial Crisis of 2008. The U.K. then moved to a “Twin Peaks”
regulatory approach, which the Netherlands and Australia also use.443
Under the Twin Peaks regulatory approach adopted by the U.K. there
is a single bank regulator, the Bank of England, for prudential supervision,
and a single regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), for business
conduct covering all financial services, including banking, securities,
currency exchange, derivatives and insurance.444 Whether that change will
survive the next financial storm is unknown, but the FCA is becoming
increasingly aggressive in its regulation as demonstrated by its participation
in the Libor and foreign exchange settlements described above.445
The regulatory dysfunction that continues in the U.S. is not being
completely ignored today. No less a personage than former Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker, a true believer in regulation, came
out in favor of more consolidated regulation in 2015. Among other things,
his proposal would consolidate the CFTC and SEC.446
That
recommendation should be pursued, and the foreign exchange market
provides an ideal laboratory for an experiment to determine if consolidated
regulation would be more effective than the present morass.
As has been described above, jurisdiction in foreign exchange markets
has been allocated among five regulators viz., the CFTC, SEC, OCC, FDIC,
and the Federal Reserve Board. Each and every regulator has promulgated
441. See Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx#nonbank
[https://perma.cc/Q6TL-HXME] (last visited June 30, 2015) (describing the non-bank firms
designated as systemically significant).
442. Who
are
we?,
FINANCIAL
SERVICES
AUTHORITY,
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/who/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/BC3R-TQTZ] (last
visited July 30, 2015).
443. See Markham, supra note 298, at 547 (describing these regulatory approaches).
444. See RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 504507 (Jerry W. Markham & Rigers Gjyshi eds., 2014) (describing the change in financial
regulation in the U.K.).
445. See supra notes 426 and 443 and accompanying text (noting involvement of FCA
in the large Libor and foreign exchange settlements).
446. The Volcker proposal quickly came under criticism from the proponents of
multiple independent regulators. Emmanuel Olaoye, Former U.S. CFTC Chair Criticizes
Volcker Call to Merge Agency With SEC, REUTERS, May 20, 2015).
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separate regulations for essentially the same product. There is no need for
this redundancy. A single business conduct regulator should be responsible
for all retail foreign exchange activities, which are largely integrated into
the operations of a handful of large banks in the commercial interbank
market and a relatively small number of retail dealers. A single regulator
should be able to look across and regulate the full range of those financial
services.447
Of course, any effort to create a single business conduct regulator will
encounter stiff resistance from the agencies that regulate foreign exchange.
Have no doubt, they will fight desperately for survival and to maintain their
turf. The several decades of unsuccessful efforts to combine the CFTC and
SEC demonstrate this.448 However, this resistance is a political matter that
needs to be overcome by demonstrating the true extent of redundancy in
the regulation of financial services and how wasteful such redundant
regulation is in application. Consolidation of regulation of the foreign
exchange market would be a good way to make such a demonstration. This
would also be an additional ground for consolidating the SEC and CFTC
into a single agency that could then act as a single regulator over all
products previously within their jurisdictions as well as foreign exchange.
Both of these agencies have experience in regulating foreign exchange, and
both have as their mission the sanctioning of fraud and manipulation. In
addition, removing the bank regulators from business conduct
responsibility for foreign exchange would restore them to their traditional
role of prudential regulation governing the safety and soundness of banks
and our banking system. That prudential regulation would include
continuing supervision over foreign exchange payment and settlement
systems that are largely used by banks in the inter-bank foreign exchange
market.
CONCLUSION
The regulation of the foreign currency exchange market demonstrates
that functional regulation has broken down and jurisdictional boundaries
are being set by entity and not by product. It would be a useful experiment
to consolidate that regulation of the foreign exchange market into a single
business conduct authority with a single set of rules. If successful, other
business conduct regulation could be consolidated as well.

447. See supra note 446 (documenting the UK “twin peaks” model with a single bank
regulator and a single business conduct regulator).
448. See Markham, supra note 298 (describing those efforts).

